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  • Ubuntu: unattended-upgrades from a local package archive

    - by Novelocrat
    I have a local apt archive with a bunch of packages I built in it. The Packages and Release file are generated by apt-ftparchive. The Release file looks like Date: Thu, 06 May 2010 23:04:33 UTC Label: PPL Origin: PPL Suite: ppl MD5Sum: ebec3527ebc8351468b2ef8796c19855 37325 Packages d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e 0 Release SHA1: a0593b663d77fde88ee35b56ae1f3c17801cfe99 37325 Packages da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 0 Release SHA256: dd73a02846aee111cac58a869c6bf650886632ba82c2172ffddd81aa4429981c 37325 Packages e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 0 Release I'm using unattended-upgrades to keep the machines in the lab up to date on security and bug fixes, but I'm finding that it doesn't pull from my local archive. The configuration file for it looks like // Automaticall upgrade packages from these (origin, archive) pairs Unattended-Upgrade::Allowed-Origins { "Ubuntu hardy-security"; "Ubuntu hardy-updates"; "PPL ppl"; }; // List of packages to not update Unattended-Upgrade::Package-Blacklist { // "vim"; // "libc6"; // "libc6-dev"; // "libc6-i686"; }; // Send email to this address for problems or packages upgrades // If empty or unset then no email is sent, make sure that you // have a working mail setup on your system. The package 'mailx' // must be installed or anything that provides /usr/bin/mail. //Unattended-Upgrade::Mail "root@localhost"; Yet, when I run sudo unattended-upgrade on one of these machines, newer package versions don't get installed. Can anyone point out what I'm getting wrong?

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  • How useful is mounting /tmp noexec?

    - by Novelocrat
    Many people (including the Securing Debian Manual) recommend mounting /tmp with the noexec,nodev,nosuid set of options. This is generally presented as one element of a 'defense-in-depth' strategy, by preventing the escalation of an attack that lets someone write a file, or an attack by a user with a legitimate account but no other writable space. Over time, however, I've encountered arguments (most prominently by Debian/Ubuntu Developer Colin Watson) that noexec is a useless measure, for a couple potential reasons: The user can run /lib/ld-linux.so <binary> in an attempt to get the same effect. The user can still run system-provided interpreters on scripts that can't be run directly Given these arguments, the potential need for more configuration (e.g. debconf likes an executable temporary directory), and the potential loss of convenience, is this a worthwhile security measure? What other holes do you know of that enable circumvention?

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