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  • how to use multiple $_name using extends Zend_Db_Table_Abstract in zend frame work.

    - by karthik
    we tried to do like this,but it is showing some errors.Our table names are users and messages. <?php class Application_Model_childconnect1 extends Zend_Db_Table_Abstract { protected $_name = 'users'; public function loginvalidation($username,$pwd) { $row = $this->fetchRow('UserName = \'' . $username . '\'and UserPW = \''. $pwd . '\''); if (!$row) { $msg="invalid"; return $msg; } else { return $row->toArray(); } } protected $_name = 'messages'; public function replymessage($message) { $data=array( 'MessageText'=>$message ); $this->insert($data); } }

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  • Required Feild validator in grid view

    - by vigna hari karthik
    Hai Friends I am having one dyanmic grid in that amount and date is not null column user should enter some thing in that spceified column.my issue is that if the save button is pressed the requried validator is firing for all the rows which is empty.it should only show if the user shows in the current row.if the user left the particular row is empty and presses the save button the error message should show in the current row not all the rows. how to do this.

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  • Understanding omission failure in distributed systems

    - by karthik A
    The following text says this which I'm not able to quite agree : client C sends a request R to server S. The time taken by a communication link to transport R over the link is D. P is the maximum time needed by S to recieve , process and reply to R. If omission failure is assumed ; then if no reply to R is received within 2(D+P) , then C will never recieve a reply to R . Why is the time here 2(D+P). As I understand shouldn't it be 2D+P ?

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  • How to find the Biggest and smallest in Int[] Array using c#

    - by karthik
    If the array is as follows, int[] array = new int[] { 7, 4, 1, 8 }; I want to find the Biggest, smallest, second smallest, second biggest If the array is as follows, int[] array = new int[] { 7, 4, 1 }; I want to find the Biggest, smallest, second smallest If the array is as follows, int[] array = new int[] { 7, 4 }; I want to find the Biggest, smallest How can i achieve this programmaticly.

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  • When SET SCAN ON used after END throws error

    - by Karthik
    Hi, Im trying to use SET SCAN ON after as follows.. SET SCAN OFF; DECLARE -- declared a variable BEGIN --update statement END; SET SCAN ON; The use of SET SCAN ON; is causing the error when i try to run the script. The error captured ORA-06550: line 16, column 1: PLS-00103: Encountered the symbol "SET" 06550. 00000 - "line %s, column %s:\n%s" *Cause: Usually a PL/SQL compilation error. *Action:

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  • Is apparent NULL pointer dereference in C actually pointer arithmetic?

    - by karthik A
    hey ive got this piece of code. It dereferences a null pointer here. But then there is an and with unsigned int. I really dont understand the whole part. Can someone explain the output.?? struct hi { long a; int b; long c; }; int main() { struct hi ob={3,4,5}; struct hi *ptr=&ob; int num= (unsigned int) & (((struct hi *)0)->b); printf("%d",num); printf("%d",*(int *)((char *)ptr + (unsigned int) & (((struct hi *)0)->b))); } The output I get is 44. But how does it work?

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  • browser backbtn with javascript

    - by karthik
    Hi Folks, I am creating a quiz game in PHP. I maintain a session from the start to the end of the quiz. When the user clicks on the back button in the middle of the quiz It display a page with message "Confirm Form Resubmission This web page requires data that you entered earlier in order to be properly displayed" So, I m trying to keep it on the same page on click of back button I have handled the "onbeforeunload" event & it's firing up too. code snippet Redirectpage { javascript:window.history.forward(1); } but still am getting the same error? thankyou folks.

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  • Wireless device bug on 13.10. BCM4313 registers as eth1 instead of wlan0 and no internet access

    - by user205691
    My Hotel wiFi requires me to login with a username & password after connecting to the hotspot. So, my browser would open a page with username & passwrd fields to login and then connect to internet. But unfortunately, firefox & chromium dont seem to work. i dont think it is browser related but a setting for the wifi router or driver which is creating this issue. using Broadcom 801.11 STA wireless driver (proprietary). tried open source as well but same result !! The image linked below shows my wifi connection setting & Chromium. The login page itself comes up after a long time and after entering the credentials, it keeps loading for ever !! it is the same case for every other browser.. so i dont think its browser issue but something to do with wifi setting or network manager stuff.. interestingly, i am able to connect to WiFi networks with WPA key without any issue. Adhoc hotspot is a problem and that is my regular home network :( .. I hope i can get some help solving this issue ! I have tried repeating the same hotspot after login from my android, by creating a virtual repeater with WPA key and it works. I can browse on ubuntu using this method.. but cant be doing this regularly ! I tried loading the same login page of the hotel wifi while browsing through my repeater wifi created on mobile and screen shot attached below. the page loads up quick and easy.. so this means something is wrong with the way network manager handles adhoc connectivity & login ?? i installed wicd0 but it crashes on startup and not helpful at all ! Screenshot of Chromium page Login page with repeated hotspot ifconfig in my terminal results: krishna@krishna-HP-ENVY-4-Notebook-PC:~$ ifconfig eth0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 28:92:4a:1d:54:fa UP BROADCAST MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1 RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000 RX bytes:0 (0.0 B) TX bytes:0 (0.0 B) eth1 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr e0:06:e6:89:fa:49 inet addr:10.24.1.71 Bcast:10.24.1.255 Mask:255.255.255.0 inet6 addr: fe80::e206:e6ff:fe89:fa49/64 Scope:Link UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1 RX packets:10940 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:348431 TX packets:6611 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000 RX bytes:7669631 (7.6 MB) TX bytes:864195 (864.1 KB) Interrupt:17 lo Link encap:Local Loopback inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0 inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1 RX packets:2146 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 TX packets:2146 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 RX bytes:166120 (166.1 KB) TX bytes:166120 (166.1 KB) I wonder why is the wireless configured under eth1 ? I think this is a bug with earlier ubuntu versions, but is this normal in 13.10 or is there a wrong configuration here ? The wireless device in my pc is BCM4313 and i have installed the bcmwl-kernel-sources, wireless-tools to support the device. i also reinstalled the bcmwl-kernel as suggested on broadcom website, via synaptic package manager. Nothing has changed this situation ! I tried booting into liveUSB and then ifconfig results show wireless under wlan0. But then the wireless connects and loads the login page. So is the problem with the device configuration now ? i really want to get this fixed before i start configuring the other stuff like ATI graphics and such on the laptop for overheating.. lack of internet access is too bad a bug for me :P any help is appreciated!

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  • Checking for Repeated Strings in 2d list

    - by Zach Santiago
    i have a program where i have a list of names and classes. i have the list in alphabetical order. now im trying to check if names repeat, add the classes to one single name. im trying to write some code like go through names if name is already in list, add the class to the one name. so an example would be, instead of having 'Anita ','phys 1443', and 'Anita','IE 3312' i would just have 'Anita','PHYS 1443','IE 3312'. How would i go about doing this in a logival way, WITHOUT using any sort of built in functions? i tried comparing indexe's like if list[i][0] == list[i+1][0], append list[i+1][1] to an emptylist. while that almost worked, it would screw up at some points along the way. here is my attempt size = len(c) i = 0 c = [['Anita', 'PHYS 1443'], ['Anita', 'IE 3312'], ['Beihuang', 'PHYS 1443'], ['Chiao-Lin', 'MATH 1426'], ['Chiao-Lin', 'IE 3312'], ['Christopher', 'CSE 1310'], ['Dylan', 'CSE 1320'], ['Edmund', 'PHYS 1443'], ['Ian', 'IE 3301'], ['Ian', 'CSE 1320'], ['Ian', 'PHYS 1443'], ['Isis', 'PHYS 1443'], ['Jonathan', 'MATH 2325'], ['Krishna', 'MATH 2325'], ['Michael', 'IE 3301'], ['Nang', 'MATH 2325'], ['Ram', 'CSE 1320'], ['Taesu', 'CSE 1320'], ["Tre'Shaun", 'IE 3312'], ["Tre'Shaun", 'MATH 2325'], ["Tre'Shaun", 'CSE 1310']] ## Check if any names repeat d.append(c[0][0]) while i < size - 1 : if c[i][0] == c[i+1][0] : d.append(c[i][1]) d.append(c[i+1][1]) else : d.append(c[i+1][0]) d.append(c[i+1][1]) i = i + 1 print d output was. ['Anita', 'PHYS 1443', 'IE 3312', 'Beihuang', 'PHYS 1443', 'Chiao-Lin', 'MATH 1426', 'MATH 1426', 'IE 3312', 'Christopher', 'CSE 1310', 'Dylan', 'CSE 1320', 'Edmund', 'PHYS 1443', 'Ian', 'IE 3301', 'IE 3301', 'CSE 1320', 'CSE 1320', 'PHYS 1443', 'Isis', 'PHYS 1443', 'Jonathan', 'MATH 2325', 'Krishna', 'MATH 2325', 'Michael', 'IE 3301', 'Nang', 'MATH 2325', 'Ram', 'CSE 1320', 'Taesu', 'CSE 1320', "Tre'Shaun", 'IE 3312', 'IE 3312', 'MATH 2325', 'MATH 2325', 'CSE 1310']

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  • Toorcon 15 (2013)

    - by danx
    The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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  • Can not login to Normal mode

    - by Technology is good
    I installed ubuntu 12 in my old PC Acer Power Series. After installation i got the Login Screen which appears unusally big. when i logged-in in some fail-safe mode. I got the normal ubuntu running. but if i restart the system i can login using fail-safe mode but i can't login normally. I think the problem must be i don't have a graphic card. Even if i do have one that must be very very low configuration one. Kindly help me with graphic card config if that is the problem with my PC. I just want to use ubuntu for normal documentation purpose. I am new to ubuntu so techcies help me with basic guidance. Thank you. Karthik Muralitharan

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  • andriod emulator application deployment error.

    - by user288686
    Hi Fellows, I have developed an application in Rhodes framework and deployed the application in an android emulator. When i try to access the application i get the following error, SD card error,Application cant access the SD card while its mounted.Please unmount the device and stop the adb server before launching the application. i have tried to unmount the SD card in the emulator but i am unable to do that. Any help will be of great use. Thanks in advance, Karthik.

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  • Presentations on OVCA & OVN

    - by uwes
    The following three presentations regarding Oracle Virtual Compute Appliance and Oracle SDN from Oracle Open World sessions are now available for download from eSTEP portal. Oracle Virtual Compute Appliance: From Power On to Production in About an Hour Charlie Boyle and Premal Savla give an overview of the Oracle Virtual Compute Appliance. This presentation is a mix of the business and technical slides. Rapid Application Deployment with Oracle Virtual Compute Appliance Kurt Hackel and Saar Maoz, both in Product Development, explain how to use Oracle VM templates to deploy applications faster and walk through a demo with Oracle VM templates for Oracle Database.  Oracle SDN: Software-Defined Networking in a Hybrid, Open Data Center Krishna Srinivasan and Ronen Kofman explain Oracle SDN and provide use cases for multi-tenant private cloud, IaaS, serving Tier 1 application and virtual network services. The presentation can be downloaded from eSTEP portal. URL: http://launch.oracle.com/ PIN: eSTEP_2011 The material can be found under tab eSTEP Download Located under: Recent Updates and Engineered Sysytems/Optimized Solutions

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  • How to access FlashVars in flash

    - by RBADS
    Hi this is my code in imageload.html http://triangleyoga.com/images/krishna.gif&audio=http://audio.iskcondesiretree.info/02_-_ISKCON_Swamis/His_Holiness_Radhanath_Swami/Bhajans/Hare_Krishna/IDT_70-Hare_Krishna_-_Radhanath_Swami.mp3"/ and in my as3 file i tried to used flashvars as: var params:Object = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters; var var1:String = params['img']; trace(var1); But it shows null.Any idea ? Thank you

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