Search Results

Search found 89 results on 4 pages for 'phishing'.

Page 4/4 | < Previous Page | 1 2 3 4 

• Using MAC Authentication for simple Web API’s consumption

  - by cibrax

  For simple scenarios of Web API consumption where identity delegation is not required, traditional http authentication schemas such as basic, certificates or digest are the most used nowadays. All these schemas rely on sending the caller credentials or some representation of it in every request message as part of the Authorization header, so they are prone to suffer phishing attacks if they are not correctly secured at transport level with https. In addition, most client applications typically authenticate two different things, the caller application and the user consuming the API on behalf of that application. For most cases, the schema is simplified by using a single set of username and password for authenticating both, making necessary to store those credentials temporally somewhere in memory. The true is that you can use two different identities, one for the user running the application, which you might authenticate just once during the first call when the application is initialized, and another identity for the application itself that you use on every call. Some cloud vendors like Windows Azure or Amazon Web Services have adopted an schema to authenticate the caller application based on a Message Authentication Code (MAC) generated with a symmetric algorithm using a key known by the two parties, the caller and the Web API. The caller must include a MAC as part of the Authorization header created from different pieces of information in the request message such as the address, the host, and some other headers. The Web API can authenticate the caller by using the key associated to it and validating the attached MAC in the request message. In that way, no credentials are sent as part of the request message, so there is no way an attacker to intercept the message and get access to those credentials. Anyways, this schema also suffers from some deficiencies that can generate attacks. For example, brute force can be still used to infer the key used for generating the MAC, and impersonate the original caller. This can be mitigated by renewing keys in a relative short period of time. This schema as any other can be complemented with transport security. Eran Rammer, one of the brains behind OAuth, has recently published an specification of a protocol based on MAC for Http authentication called Hawk. The initial version of the spec is available here. A curious fact is that the specification per se does not exist, and the specification itself is the code that Eran initially wrote using node.js. In that implementation, you can associate a key to an user, so once the MAC has been verified on the Web API, the user can be inferred from that key. Also a timestamp is used to avoid replay attacks. As a pet project, I decided to port that code to .NET using ASP.NET Web API, which is available also in github under https://github.com/pcibraro/hawknet Enjoy!.

  Read the article

• Web filtering (Proxy or DNS) with option for users to ignore the block

  - by Jon Rhoades

  We are struggling with our users visiting infected or "attack" sites and Phising in general. Most of our machines are protected by an Enterprise anti virus and monitoring solution (McAffe ePO) and we try to get people to use Firefox... But no AV is perfect and we have to endure personal machines as well (albeit on their own 'Plague' VLANs) and would like to do something about Phishing as our users seem intent on disclosing their passwords to the world... To complicate matters we don't want to implement a block for many many reasons instead we would like to implement something akin to Firefox's "Reported Scam/Phish/Attack Site" - "Get me out of here" or crucially "Let me in anyway", giving the user a choice to still infect themselves if they feel like it (or look at a site incorrectly blacklisted). The reason we can't just use Firefox is we have a core enterprise App only certified on IE6&7 - thank you Oracle. Is it possible to implement this type of advisory filtering either using a proxy (in our case Squid) or DNS? http://serverfault.com/questions/15801/what-free-options-are-available-for-web-content-filtering http://serverfault.com/questions/47520/open-source-filtering-of-https-traffic Were a good start, but they don't address the advisory aspect of the filtering.

  Read the article

• Possible DNS Injection and/or SSL hijack?

  - by Anthony

  So if I go to my site without indicating the protocol, I'm taken to: http://example.org/test.php But if I go directly to: https://example.org/test.php I get a 404 back. If I go to just: https://example.org I get a totally different site (a page about martial arts). I went to the site via https not very long ago (maybe a week?) and it was fine. This is a shared server, as I understand it, and I do not have shell access, so I'm limited to the site's CPanel to do any further investigations. But when I go to: example.org:2083 I'm taken to https://example.org:2083, which, if someone has taken over the SSL port, could mean they have taken over the 2083 part as well (at least in my paranoid mind). I'm made more nervous by the fact that the cpanel login page at the above address looks very new (better, really) compared to the last time I went to it over the weekend. It's possible that wires got crossed somewhere after a system update, but I don't want to put in my name username and password in case it's a phishing attempt. Is there any way to know for sure without shell access to know for sure if someone has taken over? If I look up the IP address for the host name, the IP address matches what I have on a phpinfo page I can get to over http. If I go to the IP address directly on port 2083, I get the same login mentioned above (new and and suspiciously nice). But the SSL cert shows as good when I go this route. So if that's the case (I know the IP is right, the cert checks out, and there isn't any DNS involved), is that enough to feel safe at that point of entry? Finally, if I can safely log in via the IP, does anyone have any advice on where to check first on CPanel for why the SSL port is forwarding to a site on karate? Thanks.

  Read the article

• IE9, HTML5 and truck load of other stuff happening around the web

  - by Harish Ranganathan

  First of all, I haven’t been updating this blog as regularly as it used to be.  Primarily, due to the fact was I was visiting a lot of cities talking about SharePoint, Web Matrix, IE9 and few other stuff.  IE9 is my new found love and I simply think we have done great work in improving the browser and browsing experiences for our users. This post would talk about IE, general things happening around the web and few misconceptions around IE (I had earlier written about IE8 and common myths When you think about the way web has transformed, its truly amazing.  Rewind back to late 90s and early 2000s, web was a luxury.  There were lot of desktop applications running around and web applications was starting to pick up.  Primarily reason was not a lot of folks were into web development and the areas of web were confined to HTML and JavaScript.  CSS was around here and there but no one took it so seriously.  XML, XSLT was fast picking up and contributed to decent web development techniques. So as a web developer all we had to worry about was, building good looking websites which worked well with IE6 and occasionally with Safari.  Firefox was  not even in the picture then and so was Chrome.  But with the various arms of W3C consortium and other bodies working actively on stuff like CSS, SVG and XHTML, few more areas came into picture when it comes to browsers supporting standards.  IE6 for sure wasn’t up to the speed and the main issue we were tackling then was privacy and piracy.  We did invest a lot of our efforts to curb piracy and one of the steps into it was that, IE7 the next version of IE would install only on genuine windows machines.  What this means, is that, people who were running pirated windows xp knowingly/unknowingly could not install IE7 and the limitations of IE6 really hurt them.  One more thing of importance is that, if you were running pirated windows, lots of chances that you didn’t get the security updates and thereby were vulnerable to run viruses/trojans on your system. Many of them actually block using IE in the first place and make it difficult to browse.  SP2 came as a big boon but again was there only for genuine windows machines. With Firefox coming as a free install and also heavily pushed by Google then, it was natural that people would try an alternative.  By then, we had started working on IE8 supporting the best standards (note HTML5, CSS 2.1 and other specs were then work in progress.  they are still) Later, Google in their infinite wisdom realized that with Firefox they were going nowhere and they released Chrome.  Now, they heavily push Chrome even for Firefox users, which is natural since its their browser. In the meanwhile, these browsers push their updates as mandatory and therefore have a very short lifecycle to add enhancements and support for stuff like CSS etc., Meanwhile, when IE8 came out, it really was the best standards supported browser and a lot of people saw our efforts in improving our browser. HTML5 is the buzz word in the industry and there is a lot of noise being made by many browsers claiming their support for it.  IE8 doesn’t have much support for HTML5.  But, with IE9 Beta, we have great support for many of HTML5 specifications.  Note that, HTML5 is still work under progress and one of the board of members working on the spec has mentioned that these specs might change and relying on them heavily is dangerous.  But, some of the advances such as video tag, etc., are indeed supported in IE9 Beta.  IE9 Beta also has full hardware acceleration support which other browsers don’t have. IE8 had advanced security features such as smartscreen filter, in-private browsing, anti-phishing and a lot of other stuff.  IE9 builds on top of these with the best in town security standards as well as support for HTML5, CSS3, Hardware acceleration, SVG and many other advancements in browser.  Read more at http://www.beautyoftheweb.com/#/highlights/html5  To summarize, IE9 Beta is really innovative and you should try it to believe what it provides.  You can visit http://www.beautyoftheweb.com/  to install as well as read more on this. Cheers !!!

  Read the article

• Joy! | Important Information About Your iPad 3G

  - by Jeff Julian

  Looks like I was one of the lucky 114,000 who AT&T lost their email to “hackers”.  Why is “hackers” in “double quotes”.  I can just imagine some executive at AT&T in their “Oh No, We Messed Up Meeting” saying, what happened?  Then someone replied, well we have had a breach and “hackers” broke in (using the quote in the air gesture) and stole our iPad 3G customers emails. Oh well, I am sure my email has been sold and sold again by many different vendors, why not AT&T now.  At least Dorothy Attwood could have gave us her email to give to someone else instead of blinking it through a newsletter system. June 13, 2010 Dear Valued AT&T Customer, Recently there was an issue that affected some of our customers with AT&T 3G service for iPad resulting in the release of their customer email addresses. I am writing to let you know that no other information was exposed and the matter has been resolved.  We apologize for the incident and any inconvenience it may have caused. Rest assured, you can continue to use your AT&T 3G service on your iPad with confidence. Here’s some additional detail: On June 7 we learned that unauthorized computer “hackers” maliciously exploited a function designed to make your iPad log-in process faster by pre-populating an AT&T authentication page with the email address you used to register your iPad for 3G service.  The self-described hackers wrote software code to randomly generate numbers that mimicked serial numbers of the AT&T SIM card for iPad – called the integrated circuit card identification (ICC-ID) – and repeatedly queried an AT&T web address.   When a number generated by the hackers matched an actual ICC-ID, the authentication page log-in screen was returned to the hackers with the email address associated with the ICC-ID already populated on the log-in screen. The hackers deliberately went to great efforts with a random program to extract possible ICC-IDs and capture customer email addresses.  They then put together a list of these emails and distributed it for their own publicity. As soon as we became aware of this situation, we took swift action to prevent any further unauthorized exposure of customer email addresses.  Within hours, AT&T disabled the mechanism that automatically populated the email address. Now, the authentication page log-in screen requires the user to enter both their email address and their password. I want to assure you that the email address and ICC-ID were the only information that was accessible. Your password, account information, the contents of your email, and any other personal information were never at risk.  The hackers never had access to AT&T communications or data networks, or your iPad.  AT&T 3G service for other mobile devices was not affected. While the attack was limited to email address and ICC-ID data, we encourage you to be alert to scams that could attempt to use this information to obtain other data or send you unwanted email. You can learn more about phishing by visiting the AT&T website. AT&T takes your privacy seriously and does not tolerate unauthorized access to its customers’ information or company websites.   We will cooperate with law enforcement in any investigation of unauthorized system access and to prosecute violators to the fullest extent of the law. AT&T acted quickly to protect your information – and we promise to keep working around the clock to keep your information safe.  Thank you very much for your understanding, and for being an AT&T customer. Sincerely, Dorothy Attwood Senior Vice President, Public Policy and Chief Privacy Officer for AT&T Technorati Tags: AT&T,iPad 3G,Email

  Read the article

• How to implement Gmail OAuth API to send email (especially via SMTP)?

  - by Curtis Gibby

  I'm developing a web application that will send emails on behalf of a logged-in user. I'm trying to use the new Gmail OAuth protocol announced described here to send these emails through the user's Gmail account (preferably using SMTP rather than IMAP, but I'm easy). However, the sample PHP code gives me a couple of problems. All of the sample code is based on IMAP, not SMTP. Why "support" the SMTP protocol if you're not going to show people how to use it? The sample code gives me a fatal error from an uncaught Zend exception -- it can't find the "INBOX" folder. Fatal error: Uncaught exception 'Zend_Mail_Storage_Exception' with message 'cannot change folder, maybe it does not exist' in path\to\xoauth-php-samples\Zend\Mail\Storage\Imap.php:467 Stack trace: #0 path\to\xoauth-php-samples\Zend\Mail\Storage\Imap.php(248): Zend_Mail_Storage_Imap-selectFolder('INBOX') #1 path\to\xoauth-php-samples\three-legged.php(184): Zend_Mail_Storage_Imap-__construct(Object(Zend_Mail_Protocol_Imap)) #2 {main} Next exception 'Zend_Mail_Storage_Exception' with message 'cannot select INBOX, is this a valid transport?' in path\to\xoauth-php-samples\Zend\Mail\Storage\Imap.php:254 Stack trace: #0 path\to\xoauth-php-samples\three-legged.php(184): Zend_Mail_Storage_Imap-__construct(Object(Zend_Mail_Protocol_Imap)) #1 {main} in path\to\xoauth-php-samples\Zend\Mail\Storage\Imap.php on line 254 I've verified that I'm getting good OAuth tokens back, I just don't know how to make the actual email transaction happen. This protocol is still rather new, so there's not much unofficial community documentation about it out there, and the official docs are unhelpfully dry stuff about the SMTP RFC. So if anyone can help get this going, I'd greatly appreciate it. Note: I've already been able to connect to Gmail's SMTP server via SSL and successfully send an email, provided that the user has given my application his/her Gmail username and password. I'd like to avoid this method, because it encourages phishing and security-minded users won't accept it. This question is not about that.

  Read the article

• Server http://www.myopenid.com/server responds that the 'check_authentication' call is not valid

  - by viatropos

  I've been struggling with this for a few days now, haven't pinpointed the problem. I am trying to get OpenID to work in Rails 2.3 and Rails 3, using ruby-openid rack-openid open_id_authentication I am logging in using my viatropos.myopenid.com account, but it consistently returns this error: Server http://www.myopenid.com/server responds that the 'check_authentication' call is not valid What could that be from, it's not a very descriptive error... Does it have to do with something ruby-specific, or is this entirely on the OpenID protocol side of things? More specifically, I am using Authlogic and ActiveRecord, so could this be a problem with my User or UserSession models somehow? Or is it more to do with the header or request? In ruby response I'm getting (from puts inside ruby-openid) is: #<OpenID::Consumer::FailureResponse:0x25e282c @reference=nil, @endpoint=#<OpenID::OpenIDServiceEndpoint:0x2601984 @local_id="http://viatropos.myopenid.com/", @display_identifier=nil, @type_uris=["http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/signon", "http://openid.net/sreg/1.0", "http://openid.net/extensions/sreg/1.1", "http://schemas.openid.net/pape/policies/2007/06/phishing-resistant", "http://openid.net/srv/ax/1.0"], @used_yadis=true, @server_url="http://www.myopenid.com/server", @canonical_id=nil, @claimed_id="http://viatropos.myopenid.com/">, @message="Server http://www.myopenid.com/server responds that the 'check_authentication' call is not valid", @contact=nil> Any tips would be greatly appreciated. Thanks

  Read the article

• Sending basic authentication information via form

  - by VolatileStorm

  I am working on a site that currently uses a basic authentication dialog box login system, that is the type of dialog that you get if you go here: http://www.dur.ac.uk/vm.boatclub/password/index.php I did not set this system up and am not in a position to easily/quickly work around it, but it DOES work. The issue however is that the dialog box is not very helpful in telling you what login information you have to use (that is which username and password combination), and so I would like to replace it with a form. I had been thinking that this wasn't possible but I wanted to ask in order to find out. Is it possible to set up an HTML form that sends the data to the server such that it accepts it in the same way that it would using this dialog box? Alternatively is it possible to set up a PHP script that would take normal form data and process it somehow passing it to the server such that it logs in? Edit: After being told that this is basic authentication I went around and have managed to find a way that works and keeps the user persistently logged in. However, this does not work in internet explorer. The solution was simply to redirect the user to: http://username:[email protected]/vm.boatclub/password/index.php But Internet Explorer removed it due to phishing uses about 3 years ago. Is there a way to use javascript to get the browser to access the site in this way? Or will I have to simply change my UI?

  Read the article

• Fix/Bypass "Cannot connect to the real website-blocked" error in Google Chrome with OpenDNS blocking

  - by George H

  I have a large problem with Chrome in my organisation. I use DNS to manage web site blocking, for sites which are not appropriate and are potentially a risk to the organisation where I do this. I only want to use Chrome over the network, as Internet Explorer has compatibility problems with some sites that we use (We cannot change this either or use different sites). Therefore using internet explorer is not a solution. I do not want to install a different browser, for multiple reasons. Mainly because of the difficulty of rewriting the customised add-ons that we use. However, recently, I have had lots of problems with Chrome SSL Errors. I cannot use my custom OpenDNS block pages, which uses the contact form to request an unblocking. Chrome often blocks OpenDNS for sites (a good example is Facebook) that request HTTPS. Some sites like https://internetbadguys.com (OpenDNS example) This means that chrome refuses to load the blocking page, explaining that the site is blocked. Instead they often call IT support, but they want a solution, as they are sick of getting lots of SSL errors. I have tried looking into ways to turning this off. I have tried: Typing "proceed". That didn't work. Typing "proceed", pressing enter. Didn't work I cannot find phishing and anti-malware any more in Chrome, from the internet guides. Not using HTTPS. However there is an automatic redirect to HTTPS on most sites. Therefore the error keeps coming up. Checking my clocks. They were correct. Does anyone have an idea on how to disabling, bypassing or working around this "feature"? EDIT: This is an example what I am talking about - I found that on google images. I do not block google. EDIT 2: My clocks are correct. I cannot stop using OpenDNS either. EDIT 3: My question is: How do I stop chrome from refusing to load pages that are blocked by OpenDNS, where the server has explicitly requested HTTPS.

  Read the article

• How to avoid open-redirect vulnerability and safely redirect on successful login (HINT: ASP.NET MVC

  - by Brad B.

  Normally, when a site requires that you are logged in before you can access a certain page, you are taken to the login screen and after successfully authenticating yourself, you are redirected back to the originally requested page. This is great for usability - but without careful scrutiny, this feature can easily become an open redirect vulnerability. Sadly, for an example of this vulnerability, look no further than the default LogOn action provided by ASP.NET MVC 2: [HttpPost] public ActionResult LogOn(LogOnModel model, string returnUrl) { if (ModelState.IsValid) { if (MembershipService.ValidateUser(model.UserName, model.Password)) { FormsService.SignIn(model.UserName, model.RememberMe); if (!String.IsNullOrEmpty(returnUrl)) { return Redirect(returnUrl); // open redirect vulnerability HERE } else { return RedirectToAction("Index", "Home"); } } else { ModelState.AddModelError("", "User name or password incorrect..."); } } return View(model); } If a user is successfully authenticated, they are redirected to "returnUrl" (if it was provided via the login form submission). Here is a simple example attack (one of many, actually) that exploits this vulnerability: Attacker, pretending to be victim's bank, sends an email to victim containing a link, like this: http://www.mybank.com/logon?returnUrl=http://www.badsite.com Having been taught to verify the ENTIRE domain name (e.g., google.com = GOOD, google.com.as31x.example.com = BAD), the victim knows the link is OK - there isn't any tricky sub-domain phishing going on. The victim clicks the link, sees their actual familiar banking website and is asked to logon Victim logs on and is subsequently redirected to http://www.badsite.com which is made to look exactly like victim's bank's website, so victim doesn't know he is now on a different site. http://www.badsite.com says something like "We need to update our records - please type in some extremely personal information below: [ssn], [address], [phone number], etc." Victim, still thinking he is on his banking website, falls for the ploy and provides attacker with the information Any ideas on how to maintain this redirect-on-successful-login functionality yet avoid the open-redirect vulnerability? I'm leaning toward the option of splitting the "returnUrl" parameter into controller/action parts and use "RedirectToRouteResult" instead of simply "Redirect". Does this approach open any new vulnerabilities? Side note: I know this open-redirect may not seem to be a big deal compared to the likes of XSS and CSRF, but us developers are the only thing protecting our customers from the bad guys - anything we can do to make the bad guys' job harder is a win in my book. Thanks, Brad

  Read the article

• SSL certificates and types for securing your websites and applications

  - by Mit Naik

  Need to share few information regarding SSL certificates and there types, which SSL certificates are widely used etc. There are several SSL certificates available in the market today inorder to secure your domains, multiple subdomains, your applications and code too. Few of the details are mentioned below. CheapSSL certificates available today are Standard Rapidssl certificate, Thwate SSL 123 etc certificates which are basic level certificates. Most of these cheap SSL certificates are domain-validated only and don't provide the greatest trust for your customers. This means you shouldn't use cheap SSL certificates on e-commerce stores or other public-facing sites that require people to trust the site. EV certificates I found Geotrust Truebusinessid with EV certificate which is one of the cheapest certificate available in market today, you can also find Thwate, Versign EV version of certificates. Its designed to prevent phishing attacks better than normal SSL certificates. What makes an EV Certificate so special? An SSL Certificate Provider has to do some extensive validation to give you one including: Verifying that your organization is legally registered and active, Verifying the address and phone number of your organization, Verifying that your organization has exclusive right to use the domain specified in the EV Certificate, Verifying that the person ordering the certificate has been authorized by the organization, Verifying that your organization is not on any government blacklists. SSL WILDCARD CERTIFICATES, SSL Wildcard Certificates are big money-savers. An SSL Wildcard Certificate allows you to secure an unlimited number of first-level sub-domains on a single domain name. For example, if you need to secure the following websites: * www.yourdomain.com * secure.yourdomain.com * product.yourdomain.com * info.yourdomain.com * download.yourdomain.com * anything.yourdomain.com and all of these websites are hosted on the multiple server box, you can purchase and install one Wildcard certificate issued to *.yourdomain.com to secure all these sites. SAN CERTIFICATES, are interesting certificates and are helpfull if you want to secure multiple domains by generating single CSR and can install the same certificate on your additional sites without generating new CSRs for all the additional domains. CODE SIGNING CERTIFICATES, A code signing certificate is a file containing a digital signature that can be used to sign executables and scripts in order to verify your identity and ensure that your code has not been tampered with since it was signed. This helps your users to determine whether your software can be trusted. Scroll to the chart below to compare cheap code signing certificates. A code signing certificate allows you to sign code using a private and public key system similar to how an SSL certificate secures a website. When you request a code signing certificate, a public/private key pair is generated. The certificate authority will then issue a code signing certificate that contains the public key. A certificate for code signing needs to be signed by a trusted certificate authority so that the operating system knows that your identity has been validated. You could still use the code signing certificate to sign and distribute malicious software but you will be held legally accountable for it. You can sign many different types of code. The most common types include Windows applications such as .exe, .cab, .dll, .ocx, and .xpi files (using an Authenticode certificate), Apple applications (using an Apple code signing certificate), Microsoft Office VBA objects and macros (using a VBA code signing certificate), .jar files (using a Java code signing certificate), .air or .airi files (using an Adobe AIR certificate), and Windows Vista drivers and other kernel-mode software (using a Vista code certificate). In reality, a code signing certificate can sign almost all types of code as long as you convert the certificate to the correct format first. Also I found the below URL which provides you good suggestion regarding purchasing best SSL certificates for securing your site, as per the Financial institution, Bank, Hosting providers, ISP, Retail Merchants etc. Please vote and provide comments or any additional suggestions regarding SSL certificates.

  Read the article

• HTG Explains: Do Non-Windows Platforms Like Mac, Android, iOS, and Linux Get Viruses?

  - by Chris Hoffman

  Viruses and other types of malware seem largely confined to Windows in the real world. Even on a Windows 8 PC, you can still get infected with malware. But how vulnerable are other operating systems to malware? When we say “viruses,” we’re actually talking about malware in general. There’s more to malware than just viruses, although the word virus is often used to talk about malware in general. Why Are All the Viruses For Windows? Not all of the malware out there is for Windows, but most of it is. We’ve tried to cover why Windows has the most viruses in the past. Windows’ popularity is definitely a big factor, but there are other reasons, too. Historically, Windows was never designed for security in the way that UNIX-like platforms were — and every popular operating system that’s not Windows is based on UNIX. Windows also has a culture of installing software by searching the web and downloading it from websites, whereas other platforms have app stores and Linux has centralized software installation from a secure source in the form of its package managers. Do Macs Get Viruses? The vast majority of malware is designed for Windows systems and Macs don’t get Windows malware. While Mac malware is much more rare, Macs are definitely not immune to malware. They can be infected by malware written specifically for Macs, and such malware does exist. At one point, over 650,000 Macs were infected with the Flashback Trojan. [Source] It infected Macs through the Java browser plugin, which is a security nightmare on every platform. Macs no longer include Java by default. Apple also has locked down Macs in other ways. Three things in particular help: Mac App Store: Rather than getting desktop programs from the web and possibly downloading malware, as inexperienced users might on Windows, they can get their applications from a secure place. It’s similar to a smartphone app store or even a Linux package manager. Gatekeeper: Current releases of Mac OS X use Gatekeeper, which only allows programs to run if they’re signed by an approved developer or if they’re from the Mac App Store. This can be disabled by geeks who need to run unsigned software, but it acts as additional protection for typical users. XProtect: Macs also have a built-in technology known as XProtect, or File Quarantine. This feature acts as a blacklist, preventing known-malicious programs from running. It functions similarly to Windows antivirus programs, but works in the background and checks applications you download. Mac malware isn’t coming out nearly as quick as Windows malware, so it’s easier for Apple to keep up. Macs are certainly not immune to all malware, and someone going out of their way to download pirated applications and disable security features may find themselves infected. But Macs are much less at risk of malware in the real world. Android is Vulnerable to Malware, Right? Android malware does exist and companies that produce Android security software would love to sell you their Android antivirus apps. But that isn’t the full picture. By default, Android devices are configured to only install apps from Google Play. They also benefit from antimalware scanning — Google Play itself scans apps for malware. You could disable this protection and go outside Google Play, getting apps from elsewhere (“sideloading”). Google will still help you if you do this, asking if you want to scan your sideloaded apps for malware when you try to install them. In China, where many, many Android devices are in use, there is no Google Play Store. Chinese Android users don’t benefit from Google’s antimalware scanning and have to get their apps from third-party app stores, which may contain infected copies of apps. The majority of Android malware comes from outside Google Play. The scary malware statistics you see primarily include users who get apps from outside Google Play, whether it’s pirating infected apps or acquiring them from untrustworthy app stores. As long as you get your apps from Google Play — or even another secure source, like the Amazon App Store — your Android phone or tablet should be secure. What About iPads and iPhones? Apple’s iOS operating system, used on its iPads, iPhones, and iPod Touches, is more locked down than even Macs and Android devices. iPad and iPhone users are forced to get their apps from Apple’s App Store. Apple is more demanding of developers than Google is — while anyone can upload an app to Google Play and have it available instantly while Google does some automated scanning, getting an app onto Apple’s App Store involves a manual review of that app by an Apple employee. The locked-down environment makes it much more difficult for malware to exist. Even if a malicious application could be installed, it wouldn’t be able to monitor what you typed into your browser and capture your online-banking information without exploiting a deeper system vulnerability. Of course, iOS devices aren’t perfect either. Researchers have proven it’s possible to create malicious apps and sneak them past the app store review process. [Source] However, if a malicious app was discovered, Apple could pull it from the store and immediately uninstall it from all devices. Google and Microsoft have this same ability with Android’s Google Play and Windows Store for new Windows 8-style apps. Does Linux Get Viruses? Malware authors don’t tend to target Linux desktops, as so few average users use them. Linux desktop users are more likely to be geeks that won’t fall for obvious tricks. As with Macs, Linux users get most of their programs from a single place — the package manager — rather than downloading them from websites. Linux also can’t run Windows software natively, so Windows viruses just can’t run. Linux desktop malware is extremely rare, but it does exist. The recent “Hand of Thief” Trojan supports a variety of Linux distributions and desktop environments, running in the background and stealing online banking information. It doesn’t have a good way if infecting Linux systems, though — you’d have to download it from a website or receive it as an email attachment and run the Trojan. [Source] This just confirms how important it is to only run trusted software on any platform, even supposedly secure ones. What About Chromebooks? Chromebooks are locked down laptops that only run the Chrome web browser and some bits around it. We’re not really aware of any form of Chrome OS malware. A Chromebook’s sandbox helps protect it against malware, but it also helps that Chromebooks aren’t very common yet. It would still be possible to infect a Chromebook, if only by tricking a user into installing a malicious browser extension from outside the Chrome web store. The malicious browser extension could run in the background, steal your passwords and online banking credentials, and send it over the web. Such malware could even run on Windows, Mac, and Linux versions of Chrome, but it would appear in the Extensions list, would require the appropriate permissions, and you’d have to agree to install it manually. And Windows RT? Microsoft’s Windows RT only runs desktop programs written by Microsoft. Users can only install “Windows 8-style apps” from the Windows Store. This means that Windows RT devices are as locked down as an iPad — an attacker would have to get a malicious app into the store and trick users into installing it or possibly find a security vulnerability that allowed them to bypass the protection. Malware is definitely at its worst on Windows. This would probably be true even if Windows had a shining security record and a history of being as secure as other operating systems, but you can definitely avoid a lot of malware just by not using Windows. Of course, no platform is a perfect malware-free environment. You should exercise some basic precautions everywhere. Even if malware was eliminated, we’d have to deal with social-engineering attacks like phishing emails asking for credit card numbers. Image Credit: stuartpilbrow on Flickr, Kansir on Flickr     

  Read the article

• CodePlex Daily Summary for Sunday, May 18, 2014

  CodePlex Daily Summary for Sunday, May 18, 2014Popular ReleasesClosedXML - The easy way to OpenXML: ClosedXML 0.70.0: A lot of fixes. See history.TBox - tool to make developer's life easier.: TBox 1.29: Bug fixing. Add LocalizationTool pluginYAXLib: Yet Another XML Serialization Library for the .NET Framework: YAXLib 2.13: Fixed a bug and added unit tests related to serializing path like aliases with one letter (e.g., './B'). Thanks go to CodeProject user B.O.B. for reporting this bug. Added `Bin/*.dll.mdb` to `.gitignore`. Fixed the issue with Indexer properties. Indexers must not be serialized/deserialized. YAXLib will ignore delegate (callback/function pointer) properties, so that the exception upon serializing them is prevented. Significant improve in cycling object reference detection Self Referr...SFDL.NET: SFDL.NET (2.2.9.2): Changelog: Neues Icon Xup.in CnL Plugin BugfixSEToolbox: SEToolbox 01.030.008 Release 1: Fixed cube editor failing to apply color to cubes. Added to cube editor, replace cube dialog, and Build Percent dialog. Corrected for hidden asteroid ore, allowing rare ore to show when importing an asteroid, or converting a 3d model to an asteroid (still appears to be limitations on rare ore in small asteroids). Allowed ore selection to Asteroid file import. (Can copy/import and convert existing asteroid to another ore). Added progress bars to common long running operations. Fixed ...Better Robocopy GUI: Command Line GUI for Robocopy: Better Robocopy GUI had become the primary plugin in Command Line GUI built on .NET 4Mini SQL Query: Mini SQL Query (1.0.71.456): Minor fixes and template corrections.Visual Studio Settings Switcher: Settings Switcher 1.1: Settings Switcher is compatible with Visual Studio 2012 and Visual Studio 2013. Express editions are not supported. NewFull support for Visual Studio 2013. Solution Settings Files (see Documentation for details.) Bug fixes and general usability improvements. There are two ways to install Settings Switcher: DOWNLOAD FROM CODEPLEXDownload the installer (.vsix) from the link above. Close all instances of Visual Studio. Double-click the .vsix file to install Settings Switcher. DOWNLOA...SharePoint Online Automation Cmdlets: Apps, Solutions and Permissions: Solutions can now be activated/deactivated/updated :-) See documentation for examples. Added Add-SPOApp and Install-SPOApp for uploading and activating apps on non-developer site collections. Also adding groups and permission levels has been included. Install Instructions Install the SharePoint Online Client components. Download and run the MSI file from the downloads section.TFS Planning and Disaster Recovery Avoidance Guide: v1.4.BETA - TFS, DR and Azure IaaS Planning Guides: Welcome to the TFS Planning and DR Avoidance Guidance What is new? A new crisper, more compact style, which is easier to consume on multiple devices without sacrificing any content. Also included are the new TFS on Azure IaaS guide and supplementary guides. Note Capacity planning workbook and posters are included in the Everything Zip package. Quality-Bar Detail Documentation has been reviewed by Visual Studio ALM Rangers Documentation has been through an independent technical review ...CRM Web API Lead Capture Example: CRM Web API Lead Capture Example: Sample Visual Studio 2013 project that provides an example of how you could use Web API and Microsoft Azure (could be deployed anywhere) to capture simple HTML form data into Dynamics CRM without directly having to integrate a .NET component.MB Tools: MDT Monitor Tool v1.4: This tool is used to connect to an MDT 2013 Monitor Webservice. The purpose is to provide an alternative to the MDT Deployment Workbench. Update: New in v1.4: Fixed bug where Dart Remote Viewer didnt work Option to show client local time instead of UTC, edit config.xml to enable/disable New in v1.2: Fixed Dart Remote Viewer not connection to full ip Issue: 1222 New in v1.1: Added timers for autorefresh of webservice info Added some better errorchecking and cleaned up the code a bit ...WinAudit: WinAudit Freeware v3.0: WinAudit.exe v3.0 MD5: 88750CCF49FF7418199B2645755830FA Known Issues: 1. Report creation can be very slow when right-to-left (Hebrew) characters are present. 2. Emsisoft Anti-Malware may stop and/or quarantine WinAudit. This happens when WinAudit attempts to obtain a list if running programmes. You will need to set an exception rule in Emsisoft to allow WinAudit to run.TerraMap (Terraria World Map Viewer): TerraMap 1.0.4: Added support for the new Terraria v1.2.4 update. New items, walls, and tiles Fixed Issue 35206: Hightlight/Find doesn't work for Demon Altars Fixed finding Demon Hearts/Shadow Orbs Added ability to find Enchanted Swords (in the stone) and Water Bolt books Fixed installer not uninstalling older versions The setup file will make sure .NET 4 is installed, install TerraMap, create desktop and start menu shortcuts, add a .wld file association, and launch TerraMap. If you prefer the zip ...Amqp.Net Lite: 0.1: This is the Alpha-quality release of the AMQP.Net Lite library.TSS.MSR: TSS.MSR v1.1: MSR's TPM2.0 access libraries and sample applications.WPF Localization Extension: v2.2.1: Issue #9277 Issue #9292 Issue #9311 Issue #9312 Issue #9313 Issue #9314Hime Parser Generator: Hime Parser Generator v1.0.0: This releases the stable version of the Hime parser generator. This release contains many bugfixes and performance enhancement. It also provides a clean API for the manipulation and debugging of context-free grammars.CtrlAltStudio Viewer: CtrlAltStudio Viewer 1.2.1.41167 Release: This release of the CtrlAltStudio Viewer includes the following significant features: Oculus Rift support. Stereoscopic 3D display support. Variable walking / flying speed. Xbox 360 Controller support. Kinect for Windows support. Based on Firestorm viewer 4.6.5 codebase. For more details, see the release notes linked to below. Release notes: http://ctrlaltstudio.com/viewer/release-notes/1-2-1-41167-release Support info: http://ctrlaltstudio.com/viewer/support Privacy policy: http:/...ExtJS based ASP.NET Controls: FineUI v4.0.6: FineUI（???） ?? ExtJS ??? ASP.NET ??? FineUI??? ?? No JavaScript，No CSS，No UpdatePanel，No ViewState，No WebServices ??????? ?????? IE 8.0+、Chrome、Firefox、Opera、Safari ???? Apache License v2.0 ?：ExtJS ?? GPL v3 ?????(http://www.sencha.com/license) ???? ??：http://fineui.com/ ??：http://fineui.com/bbs/ ??：http://fineui.com/demo/ ??：http://fineui.com/doc/ ??：http://fineui.codeplex.com/ FineUI ???? ExtJS ????????，???? ExtJS ?，?????： 1. ????? FineUI ? ExtJS ? http://fineui.com/bbs/forum.ph...New ProjectsCheburashka: Static Code Analysis Rule-set for Visual Studio SSDT projectsFree Workflow: Free Workflow Project aim to use Microsoft Workflow Manager as hosting environment to Business Process Workflow , it has its own database to manage users tasks.Jenkins Tray: Jenkins tray real time notifyMoneyManagement: ?? WCF ??????????????WCF?????。??????????????????????????????。MoonSharp: An interpreter for a very close cousin of the Lua language, written in C# for the .NET, Mono, Xamarin and Unity3D platforms.OITPMS_MVC: Online Issue Tracking and Project Management System This project was created for Bug tracking and issues that comes while creating project or on going projectSpiral Chrome: Spiral Chrome, the quick, simple, and user friendly method of phishing. Throttling Suite for Web API: The Throttling Suite provides throttling control capabilities to the .NET Web API applications. It is highly customizable product, yet simple to use.TP2 .NET: Trabajo practico 2 para la clase de .net??????-??????【??】??????????: ?????????????????,???????????????。???????????,??????:????、????、???????！ ????-????【??】????????: ????????????????,???????????,??????????????,??????????，??????????????！?????-?????【??】?????????: ??????????????????,?????????????,????,?????????,?????????????,?????,?????! ??????-??????【??】??????????: ??????????????????、????,??100%????,??????,????????????,???????????! ????-????【??】????????: ?????????????????????:????、????、??????????????,????????。????????! ?????-?????【??】?????????: ???????????????????,??????????,????????、????,??????????,??????????。 ?????-?????【??】?????????: ???????,??????:?????,?????,??????,??????????,????????。????????! ??????-??????【??】??????????: ?????????????????,??????????、??????,??????????、????、????、???????。 ??????-??????【??】??????????: ?????????????、??????????????????,????????,?????,??????,????,????,????! ????-????【??】????????: ???????????????????????????、????、????、???????????,????,????! ?????-?????【??】?????????: ?????????????????????,???????????????,????????????????????! ?????-?????【??】?????????: ?????????????????????,???????????????,???????,?????,?????,????? !!! ??????-??????【??】??????????: ????????????????????,????????:??、??、???,?????????????????????! ??????-??????【??】??????????: ??????????????????????,????“???????,???????”?????,????????????！ ??????-??????【??】??????????: ???????????,????,????,??????,????“????、????、????、????”????????,??????. ??????-??????【??】??????????: ?????????????,?????,???????????,???????,????,????,????,?????。 ?????-?????【??】?????????: ????????????,?????,???????????,???????,????,????,????,?????。 ??????-??????【??】??????????: ?????????????????????????????,??????????,????,????,?????????、??????,??????。 ????-????【??】????????: ????????????????????????,????,????,??????????。???????????????,??,??,??????????,??????... ?????-?????【??】?????????: ???????????????,?????????????? ??。????????、????、????、?????????? ???????。 ??????-??????【??】??????????: ????????????、???、??、??????????????????????????????,????????????????! ????-????【??】????????: ??????????????6?,???????????????????????????,??????????????,?????????！ ?????-?????【??】?????????: ???????????????8?，????????,????????,??????????,?????,????? ,????????!

  Read the article

• Fed Authentication Methods in OIF / IdP

  - by Damien Carru

  This article is a continuation of my previous entry where I explained how OIF/IdP leverages OAM to authenticate users at runtime: OIF/IdP internally forwards the user to OAM and indicates which Authentication Scheme should be used to challenge the user if needed OAM determine if the user should be challenged (user already authenticated, session timed out or not, session authentication level equal or higher than the level of the authentication scheme specified by OIF/IdP…) After identifying the user, OAM internally forwards the user back to OIF/IdP OIF/IdP can resume its operation In this article, I will discuss how OIF/IdP can be configured to map Federation Authentication Methods to OAM Authentication Schemes: When processing an Authn Request, where the SP requests a specific Federation Authentication Method with which the user should be challenged When sending an Assertion, where OIF/IdP sets the Federation Authentication Method in the Assertion Enjoy the reading! Overview The various Federation protocols support mechanisms allowing the partners to exchange information on: How the user should be challenged, when the SP/RP makes a request How the user was challenged, when the IdP/OP issues an SSO response When a remote SP partner redirects the user to OIF/IdP for Federation SSO, the message might contain data requesting how the user should be challenged by the IdP: this is treated as the Requested Federation Authentication Method. OIF/IdP will need to map that Requested Federation Authentication Method to a local Authentication Scheme, and then invoke OAM for user authentication/challenge with the mapped Authentication Scheme. OAM would authenticate the user if necessary with the scheme specified by OIF/IdP. Similarly, when an IdP issues an SSO response, most of the time it will need to include an identifier representing how the user was challenged: this is treated as the Federation Authentication Method. When OIF/IdP issues an Assertion, it will evaluate the Authentication Scheme with which OAM identified the user: If the Authentication Scheme can be mapped to a Federation Authentication Method, then OIF/IdP will use the result of that mapping in the outgoing SSO response: AuthenticationStatement in the SAML Assertion OpenID Response, if PAPE is enabled If the Authentication Scheme cannot be mapped, then OIF/IdP will set the Federation Authentication Method as the Authentication Scheme name in the outgoing SSO response: AuthenticationStatement in the SAML Assertion OpenID Response, if PAPE is enabled Mappings In OIF/IdP, the mapping between Federation Authentication Methods and Authentication Schemes has the following rules: One Federation Authentication Method can be mapped to several Authentication Schemes In a Federation Authentication Method <-> Authentication Schemes mapping, a single Authentication Scheme is marked as the default scheme that will be used to authenticate a user, if the SP/RP partner requests the user to be authenticated via a specific Federation Authentication Method An Authentication Scheme can be mapped to a single Federation Authentication Method Let’s examine the following example and the various use cases, based on the SAML 2.0 protocol: Mappings defined as: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport mapped to LDAPScheme, marked as the default scheme used for authentication BasicScheme urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:X509 mapped to X509Scheme, marked as the default scheme used for authentication Use cases: SP sends an AuthnRequest specifying urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:X509 as the RequestedAuthnContext: OIF/IdP will authenticate the use with X509Scheme since it is the default scheme mapped for that method. SP sends an AuthnRequest specifying urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport as the RequestedAuthnContext: OIF/IdP will authenticate the use with LDAPScheme since it is the default scheme mapped for that method, not the BasicScheme SP did not request any specific methods, and user was authenticated with BasisScheme: OIF/IdP will issue an Assertion with urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport as the FederationAuthenticationMethod SP did not request any specific methods, and user was authenticated with LDAPScheme: OIF/IdP will issue an Assertion with urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport as the FederationAuthenticationMethod SP did not request any specific methods, and user was authenticated with BasisSessionlessScheme: OIF/IdP will issue an Assertion with BasisSessionlessScheme as the FederationAuthenticationMethod, since that scheme could not be mapped to any Federation Authentication Method (in this case, the administrator would need to correct that and create a mapping) Configuration Mapping Federation Authentication Methods to OAM Authentication Schemes is protocol dependent, since the methods are defined in the various protocols (SAML 2.0, SAML 1.1, OpenID 2.0). As such, the WLST commands to set those mappings will involve: Either the SP Partner Profile and affect all Partners referencing that profile, which do not override the Federation Authentication Method to OAM Authentication Scheme mappings Or the SP Partner entry, which will only affect the SP Partner It is important to note that if an SP Partner is configured to define one or more Federation Authentication Method to OAM Authentication Scheme mappings, then all the mappings defined in the SP Partner Profile will be ignored. Authentication Schemes As discussed in the previous article, during Federation SSO, OIF/IdP will internally forward the user to OAM for authentication/verification and specify which Authentication Scheme to use. OAM will determine if a user needs to be challenged: If the user is not authenticated yet If the user is authenticated but the session timed out If the user is authenticated, but the authentication scheme level of the original authentication is lower than the level of the authentication scheme requested by OIF/IdP So even though an SP requests a specific Federation Authentication Method to be used to challenge the user, if that method is mapped to an Authentication Scheme and that at runtime OAM deems that the user does not need to be challenged with that scheme (because the user is already authenticated, session did not time out, and the session authn level is equal or higher than the one for the specified Authentication Scheme), the flow won’t result in a challenge operation. Protocols SAML 2.0 The SAML 2.0 specifications define the following Federation Authentication Methods for SAML 2.0 flows: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:unspecified urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:InternetProtocol urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Telephony urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:MobileOneFactorUnregistered urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PersonalTelephony urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PreviousSession urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:MobileOneFactorContract urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Smartcard urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Password urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:InternetProtocolPassword urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:X509 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:TLSClient urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PGP urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:SPKI urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:XMLDSig urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:SoftwarePKI urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Kerberos urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:SecureRemotePassword urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:NomadTelephony urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:AuthenticatedTelephony urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:MobileTwoFactorUnregistered urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:MobileTwoFactorContract urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:SmartcardPKI urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:TimeSyncToken Out of the box, OIF/IdP has the following mappings for the SAML 2.0 protocol: Only urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport is defined This Federation Authentication Method is mapped to: LDAPScheme, marked as the default scheme used for authentication FAAuthScheme BasicScheme BasicFAScheme This mapping is defined in the saml20-sp-partner-profile SP Partner Profile which is the default OOTB SP Partner Profile for SAML 2.0 An example of an AuthnRequest message sent by an SP to an IdP with the SP requesting a specific Federation Authentication Method to be used to challenge the user would be: <samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" Destination="https://idp.com/oamfed/idp/samlv20" ID="id-8bWn-A9o4aoMl3Nhx1DuPOOjawc-" IssueInstant="2014-03-21T20:51:11Z" Version="2.0">  <saml:Issuer ...>https://acme.com/sp</saml:Issuer>  <samlp:NameIDPolicy AllowCreate="false" Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified"/>  <samlp:RequestedAuthnContext Comparison="minimum">    <saml:AuthnContextClassRef xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">      urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport </saml:AuthnContextClassRef>  </samlp:RequestedAuthnContext></samlp:AuthnRequest> An example of an Assertion issued by an IdP would be: <samlp:Response ...>    <saml:Issuer ...>https://idp.com/oam/fed</saml:Issuer>    <samlp:Status>        <samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>    </samlp:Status>    <saml:Assertion ...>        <saml:Issuer ...>https://idp.com/oam/fed</saml:Issuer>        <dsig:Signature>            ...        </dsig:Signature>        <saml:Subject>            <saml:NameID ...>[email protected]</saml:NameID>            <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">                <saml:SubjectConfirmationData .../>            </saml:SubjectConfirmation>        </saml:Subject>        <saml:Conditions ...>            <saml:AudienceRestriction>                <saml:Audience>https://acme.com/sp</saml:Audience>            </saml:AudienceRestriction>        </saml:Conditions>        <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2014-03-21T20:53:55Z" SessionIndex="id-6i-Dm0yB-HekG6cejktwcKIFMzYE8Yrmqwfd0azz" SessionNotOnOrAfter="2014-03-21T21:53:55Z">            <saml:AuthnContext>                <saml:AuthnContextClassRef>                    urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport                </saml:AuthnContextClassRef>            </saml:AuthnContext>        </saml:AuthnStatement>    </saml:Assertion></samlp:Response> An administrator would be able to specify a mapping between a SAML 2.0 Federation Authentication Method and one or more OAM Authentication Schemes SAML 1.1 The SAML 1.1 specifications define the following Federation Authentication Methods for SAML 1.1 flows: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:unspecified urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:HardwareToken urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:X509-PKI urn:ietf:rfc:2246 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:PGP urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:SPKI urn:ietf:rfc:3075 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:XKMS urn:ietf:rfc:1510 urn:ietf:rfc:2945 Out of the box, OIF/IdP has the following mappings for the SAML 1.1 protocol: Only urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password is defined This Federation Authentication Method is mapped to: LDAPScheme, marked as the default scheme used for authentication FAAuthScheme BasicScheme BasicFAScheme This mapping is defined in the saml11-sp-partner-profile SP Partner Profile which is the default OOTB SP Partner Profile for SAML 1.1 An example of an Assertion issued by an IdP would be: <samlp:Response ...>    <samlp:Status>        <samlp:StatusCode Value="samlp:Success"/>    </samlp:Status>    <saml:Assertion Issuer="https://idp.com/oam/fed" ...>        <saml:Conditions ...>            <saml:AudienceRestriction>                <saml:Audience>https://acme.com/sp/ssov11</saml:Audience>            </saml:AudienceRestriction>        </saml:Conditions>        <saml:AuthnStatement AuthenticationInstant="2014-03-21T20:53:55Z" AuthenticationMethod="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password">            <saml:Subject>                <saml:NameID ...>[email protected]</saml:NameID>                <saml:SubjectConfirmation>                   <saml:ConfirmationMethod>                       urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer                   </saml:ConfirmationMethod>                </saml:SubjectConfirmation>            </saml:Subject>        </saml:AuthnStatement>        <dsig:Signature>            ...        </dsig:Signature>    </saml:Assertion></samlp:Response> Note: SAML 1.1 does not define an AuthnRequest message. An administrator would be able to specify a mapping between a SAML 1.1 Federation Authentication Method and one or more OAM Authentication Schemes OpenID 2.0 The OpenID 2.0 PAPE specifications define the following Federation Authentication Methods for OpenID 2.0 flows: http://schemas.openid.net/pape/policies/2007/06/phishing-resistant http://schemas.openid.net/pape/policies/2007/06/multi-factor http://schemas.openid.net/pape/policies/2007/06/multi-factor-physical Out of the box, OIF/IdP does not define any mappings for the OpenID 2.0 Federation Authentication Methods. For OpenID 2.0, the configuration will involve mapping a list of OpenID 2.0 policies to a list of Authentication Schemes. An example of an OpenID 2.0 Request message sent by an SP/RP to an IdP/OP would be: https://idp.com/openid?openid.ns=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0&openid.mode=checkid_setup&openid.claimed_id=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0%2Fidentifier_select&openid.identity=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0%2Fidentifier_select&openid.assoc_handle=id-6a5S6zhAKaRwQNUnjTKROREdAGSjWodG1el4xyz3&openid.return_to=https%3A%2F%2Facme.com%2Fopenid%3Frefid%3Did-9PKVXZmRxAeDYcgLqPm36ClzOMA-&openid.realm=https%3A%2F%2Facme.com%2Fopenid&openid.ns.ax=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fsrv%2Fax%2F1.0&openid.ax.mode=fetch_request&openid.ax.type.attr0=http%3A%2F%2Faxschema.org%2Fcontact%2Femail&openid.ax.if_available=attr0&openid.ns.pape=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fextensions%2Fpape%2F1.0&openid.pape.max_auth_age=0 An example of an Open ID 2.0 SSO Response issued by an IdP/OP would be: https://acme.com/openid?refid=id-9PKVXZmRxAeDYcgLqPm36ClzOMA-&openid.ns=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0&openid.mode=id_res&openid.op_endpoint=https%3A%2F%2Fidp.com%2Fopenid&openid.claimed_id=https%3A%2F%2Fidp.com%2Fopenid%3Fid%3Did-38iCmmlAVEXPsFjnFVKArfn5RIiF75D5doorhEgqqPM%3D&openid.identity=https%3A%2F%2Fidp.com%2Fopenid%3Fid%3Did-38iCmmlAVEXPsFjnFVKArfn5RIiF75D5doorhEgqqPM%3D&openid.return_to=https%3A%2F%2Facme.com%2Fopenid%3Frefid%3Did-9PKVXZmRxAeDYcgLqPm36ClzOMA-&openid.response_nonce=2014-03-24T19%3A20%3A06Zid-YPa2kTNNFftZkgBb460jxJGblk2g--iNwPpDI7M1&openid.assoc_handle=id-6a5S6zhAKaRwQNUnjTKROREdAGSjWodG1el4xyz3&openid.ns.ax=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fsrv%2Fax%2F1.0&openid.ax.mode=fetch_response&openid.ax.type.attr0=http%3A%2F%2Fsession%2Fcount&openid.ax.value.attr0=1&openid.ax.type.attr1=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fschema%2FnamePerson%2Ffriendly&openid.ax.value.attr1=My+name+is+Bobby+Smith&openid.ax.type.attr2=http%3A%2F%2Fschemas.openid.net%2Fax%2Fapi%2Fuser_id&openid.ax.value.attr2=bob&openid.ax.type.attr3=http%3A%2F%2Faxschema.org%2Fcontact%2Femail&openid.ax.value.attr3=bob%40oracle.com&openid.ax.type.attr4=http%3A%2F%2Fsession%2Fipaddress&openid.ax.value.attr4=10.145.120.253&openid.ns.pape=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fextensions%2Fpape%2F1.0&openid.pape.auth_time=2014-03-24T19%3A20%3A05Z&openid.pape.auth_policies=http%3A%2F%2Fschemas.openid.net%2Fpape%2Fpolicies%2F2007%2F06%2Fphishing-resistant&openid.signed=op_endpoint%2Cclaimed_id%2Cidentity%2Creturn_to%2Cresponse_nonce%2Cassoc_handle%2Cns.ax%2Cax.mode%2Cax.type.attr0%2Cax.value.attr0%2Cax.type.attr1%2Cax.value.attr1%2Cax.type.attr2%2Cax.value.attr2%2Cax.type.attr3%2Cax.value.attr3%2Cax.type.attr4%2Cax.value.attr4%2Cns.pape%2Cpape.auth_time%2Cpape.auth_policies&openid.sig=mYMgbGYSs22l8e%2FDom9NRPw15u8%3D In the next article, I will provide examples on how to configure OIF/IdP for the various protocols, to map OAM Authentication Schemes to Federation Authentication Methods.Cheers,Damien Carru

  Read the article

< Previous Page | 1 2 3 4