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  • HDD,CD,DVD - how is sector id distinguishable from data?

    - by b-gen-jack-o-neill
    Hi, as titles says, how is sector id on HDD,CD-ROM and so distinguishable from data? I mean, when I want lets say sector #52, first, head goes to track where this sector should be, than it must wait some time to spin the desired sector above the reading head. But it must somehow recognize that its sector number, and not only data that say 52. So, how is this done? Thanks.

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  • How to diagnose failing 6Gbps SATA connection?

    - by whitequark
    I have a Samsung RC530 notebook and OCZ Vertex-3 6Gbps SATA SSD working in AHCI mode. # dmesg | grep DMI SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. RC530/RC730/RC530/RC730, BIOS 03WD.M008.20110927.PSA 09/27/2011 # lspci -nn 00:1f.2 SATA controller [0106]: Intel Corporation 6 Series/C200 Series Chipset Family 6 port SATA AHCI Controller [8086:1c03] (rev 04) # sdparm -a /dev/sda /dev/sda: ATA OCZ-VERTEX3 2.15 At the boot, the following messages are present in dmesg (I am running Debian wheezy @ Linux 3.2.8): # dmesg | grep -iE '(ata|ahci)' [ 5.179783] ahci 0000:00:1f.2: version 3.0 [ 5.179802] ahci 0000:00:1f.2: PCI INT B -> GSI 19 (level, low) -> IRQ 19 [ 5.179864] ahci 0000:00:1f.2: irq 42 for MSI/MSI-X [ 5.195424] ahci 0000:00:1f.2: AHCI 0001.0300 32 slots 6 ports 6 Gbps 0x5 impl SATA mode [ 5.195429] ahci 0000:00:1f.2: flags: 64bit ncq sntf pm led clo pio slum part ems apst [ 5.195436] ahci 0000:00:1f.2: setting latency timer to 64 [ 5.204035] scsi0 : ahci [ 5.204301] scsi1 : ahci [ 5.204447] scsi2 : ahci [ 5.204592] scsi3 : ahci [ 5.204682] scsi4 : ahci [ 5.204799] scsi5 : ahci [ 5.204917] ata1: SATA max UDMA/133 abar m2048@0xf7c06000 port 0xf7c06100 irq 42 [ 5.204920] ata2: DUMMY [ 5.204923] ata3: SATA max UDMA/133 abar m2048@0xf7c06000 port 0xf7c06200 irq 42 [ 5.204924] ata4: DUMMY [ 5.204926] ata5: DUMMY [ 5.204927] ata6: DUMMY [ 5.523039] ata3: SATA link up 1.5 Gbps (SStatus 113 SControl 300) [ 5.525911] ata3.00: ATAPI: TSSTcorp CDDVDW SN-208BB, SC00, max UDMA/100 [ 5.531006] ata1: SATA link up 6.0 Gbps (SStatus 133 SControl 300) [ 5.533703] ata3.00: configured for UDMA/100 [ 5.542790] ata1.00: ATA-8: OCZ-VERTEX3, 2.15, max UDMA/133 [ 5.542800] ata1.00: 117231408 sectors, multi 16: LBA48 NCQ (depth 31/32), AA [ 5.552751] ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133 [ 5.553050] scsi 0:0:0:0: Direct-Access ATA OCZ-VERTEX3 2.15 PQ: 0 ANSI: 5 [ 5.559621] scsi 2:0:0:0: CD-ROM TSSTcorp CDDVDW SN-208BB SC00 PQ: 0 ANSI: 5 [ 5.564059] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] 117231408 512-byte logical blocks: (60.0 GB/55.8 GiB) [ 5.564127] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write Protect is off [ 5.564131] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Mode Sense: 00 3a 00 00 [ 5.564158] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write cache: enabled, read cache: enabled, doesn't support DPO or FUA [ 5.564582] sda: sda1 [ 5.564810] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Attached SCSI disk [ 5.572006] sr0: scsi3-mmc drive: 16x/24x writer dvd-ram cd/rw xa/form2 cdda tray [ 5.572010] cdrom: Uniform CD-ROM driver Revision: 3.20 [ 5.572189] sr 2:0:0:0: Attached scsi CD-ROM sr0 [ 6.717181] ata1.00: exception Emask 0x50 SAct 0x1 SErr 0x280900 action 0x6 frozen [ 6.717238] ata1.00: irq_stat 0x08000000, interface fatal error [ 6.717291] ata1: SError: { UnrecovData HostInt 10B8B BadCRC } [ 6.717342] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 6.717395] ata1.00: cmd 60/50:00:20:39:58/00:00:00:00:00/40 tag 0 ncq 40960 in [ 6.717396] res 40/00:00:20:39:58/00:00:00:00:00/40 Emask 0x50 (ATA bus error) [ 6.717503] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 6.717553] ata1: hard resetting link [ 7.033417] ata1: SATA link up 6.0 Gbps (SStatus 133 SControl 300) [ 7.055234] ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133 [ 7.055262] ata1: EH complete [ 7.147280] ata1.00: exception Emask 0x10 SAct 0xf8 SErr 0x280100 action 0x6 frozen [ 7.147340] ata1.00: irq_stat 0x08000000, interface fatal error [ 7.147393] ata1: SError: { UnrecovData 10B8B BadCRC } [ 7.147460] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.147529] ata1.00: cmd 60/08:18:88:17:41/00:00:02:00:00/40 tag 3 ncq 4096 in [ 7.147531] res 40/00:38:50:99:64/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.147691] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.147754] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.147821] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:20:f8:42:4c/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 4 ncq 131072 in [ 7.147822] res 40/00:38:50:99:64/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.147977] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.148036] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.148100] ata1.00: cmd 60/50:28:f8:43:4c/00:00:02:00:00/40 tag 5 ncq 40960 in [ 7.148101] res 40/00:38:50:99:64/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.148255] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.148315] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.148379] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:30:50:98:64/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 6 ncq 131072 in [ 7.148380] res 40/00:38:50:99:64/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.148534] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.148593] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.148657] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:38:50:99:64/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 7 ncq 131072 in [ 7.148658] res 40/00:38:50:99:64/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.148813] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.148875] ata1: hard resetting link [ 7.464842] ata1: SATA link up 6.0 Gbps (SStatus 133 SControl 300) [ 7.486794] ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133 [ 7.486822] ata1: EH complete [ 7.546395] ata1.00: exception Emask 0x10 SAct 0x2f SErr 0x280100 action 0x6 frozen [ 7.546470] ata1.00: irq_stat 0x08000000, interface fatal error [ 7.546531] ata1: SError: { UnrecovData 10B8B BadCRC } [ 7.546588] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.546648] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:00:e0:4b:61/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 0 ncq 131072 in [ 7.546649] res 40/00:28:e0:4c:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.546794] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.546847] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.546906] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:08:90:2f:48/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 1 ncq 131072 in [ 7.546907] res 40/00:28:e0:4c:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.547053] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.547106] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.547165] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:10:90:30:48/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 2 ncq 131072 in [ 7.547166] res 40/00:28:e0:4c:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.547310] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.547363] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.547422] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:18:50:c7:64/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 3 ncq 131072 in [ 7.547423] res 40/00:28:e0:4c:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.547568] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.547621] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.547681] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:28:e0:4c:61/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 5 ncq 131072 in [ 7.547682] res 40/00:28:e0:4c:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.547825] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.547882] ata1: hard resetting link [ 7.864408] ata1: SATA link up 6.0 Gbps (SStatus 133 SControl 300) [ 7.886351] ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133 [ 7.886375] ata1: EH complete [ 7.890012] ata1: limiting SATA link speed to 3.0 Gbps [ 7.890016] ata1.00: exception Emask 0x10 SAct 0x7 SErr 0x280100 action 0x6 frozen [ 7.890093] ata1.00: irq_stat 0x08000000, interface fatal error [ 7.890152] ata1: SError: { UnrecovData 10B8B BadCRC } [ 7.890210] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.890272] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:00:90:33:48/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 0 ncq 131072 in [ 7.890273] res 40/00:10:e0:4f:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.890418] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.890472] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.890530] ata1.00: cmd 60/00:08:90:34:48/01:00:02:00:00/40 tag 1 ncq 131072 in [ 7.890531] res 40/00:10:e0:4f:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.890672] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.890724] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED [ 7.890781] ata1.00: cmd 60/78:10:e0:4f:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 tag 2 ncq 61440 in [ 7.890782] res 40/00:10:e0:4f:61/00:00:02:00:00/40 Emask 0x10 (ATA bus error) [ 7.890925] ata1.00: status: { DRDY } [ 7.890981] ata1: hard resetting link [ 8.208021] ata1: SATA link up 3.0 Gbps (SStatus 123 SControl 320) [ 8.230100] ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133 [ 8.230124] ata1: EH complete Looks like the SATA interface tries to use 6Gbps link, then fails miserably and Linux fallbacks to 3Gbps. This is somewhat fine for me, as the system boots successfully each time and works under high load (cd linux-3.2.8; make -j16). I've also ran memtest86+ and it did not find any errors. What concerns me more is that Grub sometimes takes a long time to load the images and/or fails to load itself completely. The error is consistent and is probablistic: that is, each time I boot I have a certain chance to fail. Actually, I have a slight suspiction on the cause of the failure. Look at the cabling: What kind of engineer does it this way? Nah. Even 1Gbps Ethernet hardly tolerates cables bent over a small angle, and there you have 6Gbps SATA. How cound I determine and fix the cause of errors and/or switch the link to 3Gbps mode permanently?

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  • windows xp not booting up! help!

    - by Krystle
    i just used roxo to system restore my laptop from its first saved state. now it won't boot up. it just says. "bootmgr compressed" what do i do with this. FYI my laptop is an HP Mini which do not have a cd rom. so Booting up windows XP from cd to fix it won't help me.. Please Help me solve this problem?

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  • Is it possible to install Ubuntu Server 10.04 *from* a USB drive?

    - by MousePad
    I've tried the Universal USB Installer from PenDrive, and put 10.04 Ubuntu Server on it. But when I boot up and try to install, it looks for a Ubuntu CD ROM, which I do not have. I thought the whole point is to be able to install from a USB, which seems easy with the Desktop version. Why is the server version not allowing me to do this? Am I missing something?

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  • install windows from cd

    - by doug
    hi there I have an friends acer laptop but i don't have access to the bios, and I cannot boot from CD-ROM. Bios is password protected, my friend doesn't remember the password, and I'm too lazy to open and reset it. I have to install windows XP. What can I do? ty

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  • Windows install missing NTLDR

    - by Jack
    Hi all. I'm having trouble install WinXP Pro on my pc because NTLDR is missing or can't find during installation process. I highly doubt it's my DVD drive because this machine work fine before the install process. The DVD rom work. Is there a work around for this problem? edit: this is the problem that i'm having. I'm trying to reformat the hard disk with killdisk.

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  • I am building a computer, will these components work? [closed]

    - by david
    Case: Coolermaster HAF 912 Graphic card: Sapphire RADEON HD 6850 Optical Drive: SONY SATA DVD-ROM PSU: Corsair CX500 RAM: G.SKILL Ripjaws X Series 8GB (2 x 4GB) 240-Pin DDR3 SDRAM DDR3 1333 (PC3 10666) Desktop Memory Model F3-10666CL9D-8GBXL Motherboard: MSI Z77A-G43 Processor: Intel core i3 2120 Still don't know which harddrive to use, neither if i should buy a cpu cooler fan... so if you can help me, please

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  • UNMOUNTABLE BOOT VOLUME error on laptop with no CD Drive

    - by Menno
    I am getting the UNMOUNTABLE BOOT VOLUME error on my Samsung laptop which does not have a CD Rom drive. I tried to merge the C and D partitions to get more space but since then the laptop does not start up anymore. I dont care about the laptop, just about some pictures on there which I did not back up yet. I really hope someone can help me?!! I am a new user, so cant post pictures, but can send a screenshot if needed.

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  • Running Spinrite from USB drive?

    - by Snackmoore
    Hi Everyone, I need to use spinrite on my notebook which has no cd-rom. Can one tell me how I could install and run spinrite from a USB thumbdrive? such that I could boot the notebook up with a thumbdrive and start spinrite. Are all USB thumbdrive capable of booting? I don't even know how to make them boot. Thank you very much in advance. Best Regards.

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  • Installing Ubuntu: root failed on restart

    - by Jokerboy
    I just installed Ubuntu. At the end, it tells me to keep away the CD and to restart. After I restart it tells me: searching for boot record form ide-0..not found searching for boot record form cdrom..not found root failure press any key to continue reboot or select proper boot device. I have just one CD-ROM and one IDE hard drive.

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  • Hard Drive Won't Boot After OS Install

    - by Chris
    This is my step by step process on a Dell Inspiron 6000 with a brand new 320 HD: Turn on Laptop Insert Xubuntu 9.1 disc Boot to CD-rom After boot has finished, I install and instance of Xubuntu on the machine After install (without any errors), I reboot the the machine On reboot, the BIOS claims to be unable to read from device What could this be? (Feel free to ask for more information to perform a proper diagnosis)

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  • Status: 0xc00000e9

    - by Ryan Galloza
    When I start up windows normally it just freezes , I click "Launch Startup Repair" I get this: "Windows has encountered a problem communicating with a device connected to your computer. This error can be caused by unplugging a removable storage device such as an external USB drive while the device is in use, or by faulty hardware such as a hard drive or CD-ROM drive that is failing. Make sure any removable is properly connected and then restart your computer If you continue to receive this error message, contact the hardware manufacturer" How do I fix this problem?

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  • vmdk to live cd - VMware vmxnet virtual NIC driver Kernel panic

    - by ronalchn
    Task I am trying to convert a virtual machine to a live CD. Specifically, the virtual machine I am trying to convert is the IOI 2013 Competition Environment. In this task, I am aided by a guide Converting a virtual disk image: VDI or VMDK to an ISO you can distribute. Symptoms However, after getting through all the instructions, the live CD causes a kernel panic on boot on bare metal. In particular, the screen shows: [0.737348] cdrom: Uniform CD-ROM driver Revision: 3.20 [0.737503] sr 3:0:0:0: >Attached scsi CD-ROM sr0 [0.737638] sr 3:0:0:0: >Attached scsi generic sg2 type 5 [0.737771] Freeing unused kernel memory: 756k freed [0.738093] Write protecting the kernel text: 5960k [0.738155] Write protecting the kernel read-only data: 2424k [0.738224] NX-protecting the kernel data: 4280k Loading, please wait... [0.752252] udevd[100]: starting version 175 [0.768708] VMware vmxnet3 virtual NIC driver - version 1.1.29.0-k-NAPI [0.781204] VMware PVSCSI driver - version 1.0.2.0-k [0.789555] VMware vmxnet virtual NIC driver [0.799356] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000200 [0.799356] [0.799472] Pid: 1, comm: init Tainted: G 0 3.5.0-17-generic #28-Ubuntu [0.799549] Call Trace: [0.799603] [<c15bf0ec>] panic+0x81/0x17b [0.799654] [<c104a6a5>] do_exit+0x745/0x7a0 [0.799707] [<c104a9a4>] do_group_exit+0x34/0xa0 [0.799760] [<c104aa28>] sys_exit_group+0x18/0x20 [0.799813] [<c15cff5f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x28 Possible problem I suspect that the problem is the VMware vmxnet virtual NIC driver - however, I do not know how I can uninstall it, and possibly install one for a bare metal machine. If anyone knows which packages needs installing/uninstalling at the .rootfs/ chroot directory stage, please let me know. Details on procedure Do note that after importing the .ova file into Virtualbox, the virtual machine is stored as a .vmdk file already, and not a .vdi file. I would like to point out some results of the procedure followed in case of any questions. This is after extracting the filesystem from the .raw file to the .rootfs/ directory mentioned in the blog. I changed the filesystem table as mentioned in the blog, then looked at the possible "kernel optimized for virtualization". However, I found that linux-image-generic was already installed. Also, when running the command dpkg-query --showformat='${Package}\n' -W 'vmware-tools*' (or dpkg-query --showformat='${Package}\n' -W '*-virtual'), no packages were found. Thus, I did not find any virtualization specific packages. I proceeded to generate the iso following the steps in the blog, and burned it to a DVD.

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  • Windows update on netbook requires CD (hint, there's no CD drive)

    - by bwooceli
    An "Important" update for Microsoft Works (via Windows Update) on a Dell netbook gets about halfway through and then pops up with the super-awesome "Please insert Microsoft Works 9.0 disc" message. Of course, the netbook has no CD rom drive, there is no handy folder (that i can find) containing "Works9.msi", and I have no Works9 disc. It wouldn't be so bad, except the update keeps coming up everytime WU runs. Any suggestions?

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  • Can an old MacBook be upgraded to OS X Lion?

    - by itenyh
    I've just got a really old MacBook and I want to upgrade it to the latest OS version. I do not know if it supports to be upgraded, the config of this MacBook is as below: Model Name: MacBook Model Identifier: MacBook1, 1 Processor Name: Intel Core Duo Processor speed: 1.83 GHz The number of processors: 1 Total Number Of Cores: 2 L2 cache: 2 MB Memory: 1 GB Bus speed: 667 MHz Boot ROM Version: MB11.006 If I increase the memory, can I upgrade it?

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  • New Product: Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 – Small, Smart, Connected

    - by terrencebarr
    The Internet of Things (IoT) is coming. And, with todays launch of the Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 product, Java is going to play an even greater role in it. Java in the Internet of Things By all accounts, intelligent embedded devices are penetrating the world around us – driving industrial processes, monitoring environmental conditions, providing better health care, analyzing and processing data, and much more. And these devices are becoming increasingly connected, adding another dimension of utility. Welcome to the Internet of Things. As I blogged yesterday, this is a huge opportunity for the Java technology and ecosystem. To enable and utilize these billions of devices effectively you need a programming model, tools, and protocols which provide a feature-rich, consistent, scalable, manageable, and interoperable platform.  Java technology is ideally suited to address these technical and business problems, enabling you eliminate many of the typical challenges in designing embedded solutions. By using Java you can focus on building smarter, more valuable embedded solutions faster. To wit, Java technology is already powering around 10 billion devices worldwide. Delivering on this vision and accelerating the growth of embedded Java solutions, Oracle is today announcing a brand-new product: Oracle Java Micro Edition (ME) Embedded 3.2, accompanied by an update release of the Java ME Software Development Kit (SDK) to version 3.2. What is Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2? Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 is a complete Java runtime client, optimized for ARM architecture connected microcontrollers and other resource-constrained systems. The product provides dedicated embedded functionality and is targeted for low-power, limited memory devices requiring support for a range of network services and I/O interfaces.  What features and APIs are provided by Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2? Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 is a Java ME runtime based on CLDC 1.1 (JSR-139) and IMP-NG (JSR-228). The runtime and virtual machine (VM) are highly optimized for embedded use. Also included in the product are the following optional JSRs and Oracle APIs: File I/O API’s (JSR-75)  Wireless Messaging API’s (JSR-120) Web Services (JSR-172) Security and Trust Services subset (JSR-177) Location API’s (JSR-179) XML API’s (JSR-280)  Device Access API Application Management System (AMS) API AccessPoint API Logging API Additional embedded features are: Remote application management system Support for continuous 24×7 operation Application monitoring, auto-start, and system recovery Application access to peripheral interfaces such as GPIO, I2C, SPIO, memory mapped I/O Application level logging framework, including option for remote logging Headless on-device debugging – source level Java application debugging over IP Connection Remote configuration of the Java VM What type of platforms are targeted by Oracle Java ME 3.2 Embedded? The product is designed for embedded, always-on, resource-constrained, headless (no graphics/no UI), connected (wired or wireless) devices with a variety of peripheral I/O.  The high-level system requirements are as follows: System based on ARM architecture SOCs Memory footprint (approximate) from 130 KB RAM/350KB ROM (for a minimal, customized configuration) to 700 KB RAM/1500 KB ROM (for the full, standard configuration)  Very simple embedded kernel, or a more capable embedded OS/RTOS At least one type of network connection (wired or wireless) The initial release of the product is delivered as a device emulation environment for x86/Windows desktop computers, integrated with the Java ME SDK 3.2. A standard binary of Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 for ARM KEIL development boards based on ARM Cortex M-3/4 (KEIL MCBSTM32F200 using ST Micro SOC STM32F207IG) will soon be available for download from the Oracle Technology Network (OTN).  What types of applications can I develop with Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2? The Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 product is a full-featured embedded Java runtime supporting applications based on the IMP-NG application model, which is derived from the well-known MIDP 2 application model. The runtime supports execution of multiple concurrent applications, remote application management, versatile connectivity, and a rich set of APIs and features relevant for embedded use cases, including the ability to interact with peripheral I/O directly from Java applications. This rich feature set, coupled with familiar and best-in class software development tools, allows developers to quickly build and deploy sophisticated embedded solutions for a wide range of use cases. Target markets well supported by Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 include wireless modules for M2M, industrial and building control, smart grid infrastructure, home automation, and environmental sensors and tracking. What tools are available for embedded application development for Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2? Along with the release of Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2, Oracle is also making available an updated version of the Java ME Software Development Kit (SDK), together with plug-ins for the NetBeans and Eclipse IDEs, to deliver a complete development environment for embedded application development.  OK – sounds great! Where can I find out more? And how do I get started? There is a complete set of information, data sheet, API documentation, “Getting Started Guide”, FAQ, and download links available: For an overview of Oracle Embeddable Java, see here. For the Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 press release, see here. For the Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 data sheet, see here. For the Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 landing page, see here. For the Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 documentation page, including a “Getting Started Guide” and FAQ, see here. For the Oracle Java ME SDK 3.2 landing and download page, see here. Finally, to ask more questions, please see the OTN “Java ME Embedded” forum To get started, grab the “Getting Started Guide” and download the Java ME SDK 3.2, which includes the Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 device emulation.  Can I learn more about Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 at JavaOne and/or Java Embedded @ JavaOne? Glad you asked Both conferences, JavaOne and Java Embedded @ JavaOne, will feature a host of content and information around the new Oracle Java ME Embedded 3.2 product, from technical and business sessions, to hands-on tutorials, and demos. Stay tuned, I will post details shortly. Cheers, – Terrence Filed under: Mobile & Embedded Tagged: "Oracle Java ME Embedded", Connected, embedded, Embedded Java, Java Embedded @ JavaOne, JavaOne, Smart

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  • Toorcon 15 (2013)

    - by danx
    The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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  • Unable to install scanner software for Cannon Scanner

    - by Gerrie Jooste
    I am getting the following message when I am trying to do a CanonScan 5600F installation and setup from CD-ROM Archive: /media/CANOSCAN/MSETUP4.EXE [/media/CANOSCAN/MSETUP4.EXE] End-of-central-directory signature not found. Either this file is not a zipfile, or it constitutes one disk of a multi-part archive. In the latter case the central directory and zipfile comment will be found on the last disk(s) of this archive. zipinfo: cannot find zipfile directory in one of /media/CANOSCAN/MSETUP4.EXE or /media/CANOSCAN/MSETUP4.EXE.zip, and cannot find /media/CANOSCAN/MSETUP4.EXE.ZIP, period.

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  • Ubuntu Touch porting: bad file tree

    - by fcole90
    I'm trying to port ubuntu touch to Samsung Galaxy S Plus but I'm finding it really difficult. The problems at first were to find a good CM rom as base, because this device is not officially supported by CM. Currently I'm using EhndroixIII but now I'm founding a lot of problems with the porting guide. In particular my file tree seems totally different from the one of the guide. For example, there is no device folder. What can I do to solve? Should I create those files? My repository is https://github.com/fcole90/utouch-sgsp.git

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