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  • SQLAuthority News – 2 Security Updates for SQL Server 2000 SP 4 Users

    - by pinaldave
    If you are using SQL Server 2000 still today my very first recommendation to you is to upgrade to SQL Server 2012. SQL Server 2000 is now 12 years old product and since then many new enhancements as well features which are relevant to current growth and progress in Informational Industry. Now is the time to catch up with the latest trends. Here is one more point for you to notice if this helps you consider to upgrade to the latest version. One can’t upgrade directly from SQL Server 2000 to SQL Server 2012. You need to first upgrade to either SQL Server 2005/2008/R2 and then further plan to upgrade to SQL Server 2012. There is no direct upgrade path for SQL Server 2000 to SQL Server 2012. I strongly believe this is the time to upgrade to the latest version. Well, also there is a rule that to let something continue if it is not broken and working fine. If you are following that rule and still using SQL Server 2000 I strongly suggest that you upgrade your SQL Server 2000 SP4 and update it with latest Security updates. Here are two important SQL Server Security Updates. Security Update for SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 4 (KB983811) Security Update for SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 4 (KB983812) As we are talking about SQL Server 2000 let me ask you a quick question – how many of you are still using SQL Server 2000 or earlier version in a production system on at least one server? Reference: Pinal Dave (http://blog.sqlauthority.com) Filed under: PostADay, SQL, SQL Authority, SQL Download, SQL Query, SQL Security, SQL Server, SQL Tips and Tricks, T SQL, Technology

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  • Web security course ?

    - by vtortola
    I'd like to do a course about web security. I've seen some certifications that could be interesting: CIW Web Security Professional CISSP® - Certified Information Systems Security Professional Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional What do you know about these certifications? are they recognized? I'm not trying to become a hacker, I just want to ensure I have enough knowledge about web security to cope with today internet. From my inexpert point of view, "Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional" looks exactly as I want, the problem is that it cost more than 500 bucks! Why certification? well, I want to learn but I would like also have a way to demonstrate to a future employer/customer that I had to study and pass exams, not only attend to a course. Regards.

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  • Security aspects of an ASP.NET that can be pointed out to the client

    - by Maxim V. Pavlov
    I need to write several passages of text in an offer to the client about the security layer in ASP.NET MVC web solution. I am aware of security that comes along with MVC 3 and an improvements in MVC 4. But all of them are non conceptual, except for AntiForgeryToken (AntiXSS) and built-in SQL Injection immunity (with a little of encoding needed by hand). What would be the main point of ASP.NET security I can "show off" in an offer to the client?

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  • Open Source Security packages for Rails

    - by Edwin
    I'm currently creating a complete web application using Rails 3 to familiarize myself with its inner workings and to gain a better appreciation of a working web application's moving parts. (Plus, since I'm still working on my degree, I hope that it will give me a better idea of what's BS in my education requirements and which weaknesses/skills I should focus on.) The example application I'm working on is an ecommerce site, and I've already configured the backend, routes, controllers, and so on. As part of the application, I'd like to integrate a second layer of security on top of the one Rails already provides for user authentication. However, I've been unable to find any on Google, with the exception of OAuth - which, from my understanding, is meant to secure API calls. While I could roll my own secure authentication system, I'm only in my second year of college and recognize that A) I know little about security, and B) there are developers that know much more about security that are working on open-source projects. What are some actively developed open-source security packages or frameworks that can be easily added to Rails? Pros and cons are not necessary, as I can do the research myself. P.S. I'm not sure whether I posted this in the right SE site; please migrate to SO or Security if it is more appropriate there.

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  • j2ee implementing security and using a framwork pros and cons

    - by Ismail Marmoush
    I'm a newbie to j2ee security, and i'm not j2ee expert either, though i'm really willing to put some effort and learn I've an application that i'm about to develop on Google App Engine (GAE) --with no time constraints. As you know GAE handles a lot of web container security issues for you, also I will be using openID for authentication exclusively (sessions will be handled by provider). GAE supports SSL which will help with confidentiality and integrity maybe. Authorization can be done through filters. I know reinventing the wheel is a mess, but I was looking forward to learn something about security and implement that in my new app. so what the pros and cons of using a framework like shiro, spring security, jguard etc or filling the rest of gaps on my own ?

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  • Weaknesses of 3-Strike Security

    - by prelic
    I've been reading some literature on security, specifically password security/encryption, and there's been one thing that I've been wondering: is the 3-strike rule a perfect solution to password security? That is, if the number of password attempts is limited to some small number, after which all authentication requests will not be honored, will that not protect users from intrusion? I realize gaining access or control over something doesn't always mean going through the authentication system, but doesn't this feature make dictionary/brute-force attacks obsolete? Is there something I'm missing?

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  • Monday, Oct 1 at OpenWorld - Database Security Must See Sessions

    - by Troy Kitch
    TIME TITLE LOCATION 12:15 - 1:15 PM Database Security Inside-Out: Latest Innovations in Database Security (CON8686) Moscone South - 102 3:15 - 4:15 PM Oracle Database Security Solutions Customer Panel: Real-World Case Studies (CON8674) Moscone South - 270 4:45 - 5:45 PM Latest Innovations and Best Practices for Oracle Database Auditing (CON8661) Moscone South - 303

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  • Spring security request matcher is not working with regex

    - by Felipe Cardoso Martins
    Using Spring MVC + Security I have a business requirement that the users from SEC (Security team) has full access to the application and FRAUD (Anti-fraud team) has only access to the pages that URL not contains the words "block" or "update" with case insensitive. Bellow, all spring dependencies: $ mvn dependency:tree | grep spring [INFO] +- org.springframework:spring-webmvc:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-asm:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-beans:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-context:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-context-support:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | \- org.springframework:spring-expression:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework:spring-core:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework:spring-web:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework.security:spring-security-core:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | \- org.springframework:spring-aop:jar:3.0.7.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework.security:spring-security-web:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-jdbc:jar:3.0.7.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | \- org.springframework:spring-tx:jar:3.0.7.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework.security:spring-security-config:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework.security:spring-security-acl:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile Bellow, some examples of mapped URL path from spring log: Mapped URL path [/index] onto handler 'homeController' Mapped URL path [/index.*] onto handler 'homeController' Mapped URL path [/index/] onto handler 'homeController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/block] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/block.*] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/block/] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/confirmBlock] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/confirmBlock.*] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/confirmBlock/] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/user/update] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/update.*] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/update/] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/index] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/index.*] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/index/] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/search] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/search.*] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/search/] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/doSearch] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/doSearch.*] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/doSearch/] onto handler 'searchController' Bellow, a test of the regular expressions used in spring-security.xml (I'm not a regex speciality, improvements are welcome =]): import java.util.Arrays; import java.util.List; public class RegexTest { public static void main(String[] args) { List<String> pathSamples = Arrays.asList( "/index", "/index.*", "/index/", "/cellphone/block", "/cellphone/block.*", "/cellphone/block/", "/cellphone/confirmBlock", "/cellphone/confirmBlock.*", "/cellphone/confirmBlock/", "/user/update", "/user/update.*", "/user/update/", "/user/index", "/user/index.*", "/user/index/", "/search", "/search.*", "/search/", "/doSearch", "/doSearch.*", "/doSearch/"); for (String pathSample : pathSamples) { System.out.println("Path sample: " + pathSample + " - SEC: " + pathSample.matches("^.*$") + " | FRAUD: " + pathSample.matches("^(?!.*(?i)(block|update)).*$")); } } } Bellow, the console result of Java class above: Path sample: /index - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /index.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /index/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /cellphone/block - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/block.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/block/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/confirmBlock - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/confirmBlock.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/confirmBlock/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /user/update - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /user/update.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /user/update/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /user/index - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /user/index.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /user/index/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /search - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /search.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /search/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /doSearch - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /doSearch.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /doSearch/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Tests Scenario 1 Bellow, the important part of spring-security.xml: <security:http entry-point-ref="entryPoint" request-matcher="regex"> <security:intercept-url pattern="^.*$" access="ROLE_SEC" /> <security:intercept-url pattern="^(?!.*(?i)(block|update)).*$" access="ROLE_FRAUD" /> <security:access-denied-handler error-page="/access-denied.html" /> <security:form-login always-use-default-target="false" login-processing-url="/doLogin.html" authentication-failure-handler-ref="authFailHandler" authentication-success-handler-ref="authSuccessHandler" /> <security:logout logout-url="/logout.html" success-handler-ref="logoutSuccessHandler" /> </security:http> Behaviour: FRAUD group **can't" access any page SEC group works fine Scenario 2 NOTE that I only changed the order of intercept-url in spring-security.xml bellow: <security:http entry-point-ref="entryPoint" request-matcher="regex"> <security:intercept-url pattern="^(?!.*(?i)(block|update)).*$" access="ROLE_FRAUD" /> <security:intercept-url pattern="^.*$" access="ROLE_SEC" /> <security:access-denied-handler error-page="/access-denied.html" /> <security:form-login always-use-default-target="false" login-processing-url="/doLogin.html" authentication-failure-handler-ref="authFailHandler" authentication-success-handler-ref="authSuccessHandler" /> <security:logout logout-url="/logout.html" success-handler-ref="logoutSuccessHandler" /> </security:http> Behaviour: SEC group **can't" access any page FRAUD group works fine Conclusion I did something wrong or spring-security have a bug. The problem already was solved in a very bad way, but I need to fix it quickly. Anyone knows some tricks to debug better it without open the frameworks code? Cheers, Felipe

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  • Deploying an ADF Secure Application using WLS Console

    - by juan.ruiz
    Last week I worked on a requirement from a customer that wanted to understand how to deploy to WLS an application with ADF Security without using JDeveloper. The main question was, what steps where needed in order to set up Enterprise Roles, Security Policies and Application Credentials. In this entry I will explain the steps taken using JDeveloper 11.1.1.2. 0 Requirements: Instead of building a sample application from scratch, we can use Andrejus 's sample application that contains all the security pieces that we need. Open and migrate the project. Also make sure you adjust the database settings accordingly. Creating the EAR file Review the Security settings of the application by going into the Application -> Secure menu and see that there are two enterprise roles as well as the ADF Policies enforcing security on the main page. Make sure the Application Module uses the Data Source instead of JDBC URL for its connection type, also take note of the data source name - in my case I have: java:comp/env/jdbc/HrDS To facilitate the access to this application once we deploy it. Go to your ViewController project properties select the Java EE Application category and give it a meaningful name to the context root as well to the Application Name Go to the ADFSecurityWL Application properties -> Deployment  and create a new EAR deployment profile. Uncheck the Auto generate and Synchronize weblogic-jdbc.xml Descriptors During Deployment Deploy the application as an EAR file. Deploying the Application to WLS using the WLS Console On the WLS console create a JNDI data source. This is the part that I found more tricky of the hole exercise given that the name should match the AM's data source name, however the naming convention that worked for me was jdbc.HrDS Now, deploy the application manually by selecting deployments ->Install look for the EAR and follow the default steps. If this is the firs time you deploy the application, once the deployment finishes you will be asked to Activate Changes on the domain, these changes contain all the security policies and application roles insertion into the WLS instance. Creating Roles and User Groups for the Application To finish the after-deployment set up, we need to create the groups that are the equivalent of the Enterprise Roles of ADF Security. For our sample we have two Enterprise Roles employeesApplication and managersApplication. After that, we create the application users and assign them into their respective groups. Now we can run the application and test the security constraints

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  • Spring Security - is Role and ACL security overkill?

    - by HDave
    I have a 3 tier application that requires security authorizations be placed on various domain objects. Whether I use Spring's ACL implementation or roll my own, it seems to me that ACL based security can only be used to authorize (service) methods and cannot be used to authorize URL or web service invocations. I think this because how could a web service call check the ACL before it has hydrated the XML payload? Also, all the examples for web access security in the Spring documentation are securing URL's based on Role. Is it typical to use Spring's roles to secure web presentation and web service calls, while at the same time using ACL's to secure the business methods? Is this overkill?

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  • How I might think like a hacker so that I can anticipate security vulnerabilities in .NET or Java before a hacker hands me my hat [closed]

    - by Matthew Patrick Cashatt
    Premise I make a living developing web-based applications for all form-factors (mobile, tablet, laptop, etc). I make heavy use of SOA, and send and receive most data as JSON objects. Although most of my work is completed on the .NET or Java stacks, I am also recently delving into Node.js. This new stack has got me thinking that I know reasonably well how to secure applications using known facilities of .NET and Java, but I am woefully ignorant when it comes to best practices or, more importantly, the driving motivation behind the best practices. You see, as I gain more prominent clientele, I need to be able to assure them that their applications are secure and, in order to do that, I feel that I should learn to think like a malevolent hacker. What motivates a malevolent hacker: What is their prime mover? What is it that they are most after? Ultimately, the answer is money or notoriety I am sure, but I think it would be good to understand the nuanced motivators that lead to those ends: credit card numbers, damning information, corporate espionage, shutting down a highly visible site, etc. As an extension of question #1--but more specific--what are the things most likely to be seeked out by a hacker in almost any application? Passwords? Financial info? Profile data that will gain them access to other applications a user has joined? Let me be clear here. This is not judgement for or against the aforementioned motivations because that is not the goal of this post. I simply want to know what motivates a hacker regardless of our individual judgement. What are some heuristics followed to accomplish hacker goals? Ultimately specific processes would be great to know; however, in order to think like a hacker, I would really value your comments on the broader heuristics followed. For example: "A hacker always looks first for the low-hanging fruit such as http spoofing" or "In the absence of a CAPTCHA or other deterrent, a hacker will likely run a cracking script against a login prompt and then go from there." Possibly, "A hacker will try and attack a site via Foo (browser) first as it is known for Bar vulnerability. What are the most common hacks employed when following the common heuristics? Specifics here. Http spoofing, password cracking, SQL injection, etc. Disclaimer I am not a hacker, nor am I judging hackers (Heck--I even respect their ingenuity). I simply want to learn how I might think like a hacker so that I may begin to anticipate vulnerabilities before .NET or Java hands me a way to defend against them after the fact.

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  • WCF client encrypt message to JAVA WS using username_token with message protection client policy

    - by Alex
    I am trying to create a WCF client APP that is consuming a JAVA WS that uses username_token with message protection client policy. There is a private key that is installed on the server and a public certificate file was exported from the JKS keystore file. I have installed the public key into certificate store via MMC under Personal certificates. I am trying to create a binding that will encrypt the message and pass the username as part of the payload. I have been researching and trying the different configurations for about a day now. I found a similar situation on the msdn forum: http://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/en/wcf/thread/ce4b1bf5-8357-4e15-beb7-2e71b27d7415 This is the configuration that I am using in my app.config <customBinding> <binding name="certbinding"> <security authenticationMode="UserNameOverTransport"> <secureConversationBootstrap /> </security> <httpsTransport requireClientCertificate="true" /> </binding> </customBinding> <endpoint address="https://localhost:8443/ZZZService?wsdl" binding="customBinding" bindingConfiguration="cbinding" contract="XXX.YYYPortType" name="ServiceEndPointCfg" /> And this is the client code that I am using: EndpointAddress endpointAddress = new EndpointAddress(url + "?wsdl"); P6.WCF.Project.ProjectPortTypeClient proxy = new P6.WCF.Project.ProjectPortTypeClient("ServiceEndPointCfg", endpointAddress); proxy.ClientCredentials.UserName.UserName = UserName; proxy.ClientCredentials.ClientCertificate.SetCertificate(StoreLocation.CurrentUser, StoreName.My, X509FindType.FindByThumbprint, "67 87 ba 28 80 a6 27 f8 01 a6 53 2f 4a 43 3b 47 3e 88 5a c1"); var projects = proxy.ReadProjects(readProjects); This is the .NET CLient error I get: Error Log: Invalid security information. On the Java WS side I trace the log : SEVERE: Encryption is enabled but there is no encrypted key in the request. I traced the SOAP headers and payload and did confirm the encrypted key is not there. Headers: {expect=[100-continue], content-type=[text/xml; charset=utf-8], connection=[Keep-Alive], host=[localhost:8443], Content-Length=[731], vsdebuggercausalitydata=[uIDPo6hC1kng3ehImoceZNpAjXsAAAAAUBpXWdHrtkSTXPWB7oOvGZwi7MLEYUZKuRTz1XkJ3soACQAA], SOAPAction=[""], Content-Type=[text/xml; charset=utf-8]} Payload: <s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:u="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"><s:Header><o:Security s:mustUnderstand="1" xmlns:o="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"><o:UsernameToken u:Id="uuid-5809743b-d6e1-41a3-bc7c-66eba0a00998-1"><o:Username>admin</o:Username><o:Password>admin</o:Password></o:UsernameToken></o:Security></s:Header><s:Body xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"><ReadProjects xmlns="http://xmlns.dev.com/WS/Project/V1"><Field>ObjectId</Field><Filter>Id='WS-Demo'</Filter></ReadProjects></s:Body></s:Envelope> I have also tryed some other bindings but with no success: <basicHttpBinding> <binding name="basicHttp"> <security mode="TransportWithMessageCredential"> <message clientCredentialType="Certificate"/> </security> </binding> </basicHttpBinding> <wsHttpBinding> <binding name="wsBinding"> <security mode="Message"> <message clientCredentialType="UserName" negotiateServiceCredential="false" /> </security> </binding> </wsHttpBinding> Your help will be greatly aprreciatted! Thanks!

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  • Configuring WS-Security with PeopleSoft Web Services

    - by Dave Bain
    I was speaking with a customer a few days ago about PeopleSoft Web Services.  The customer created a web service but when they went to deploy it, they had so many problems configuring ws-security, they pulled the service.  They spent several days trying to get it working but never got it working so they've put it on hold until they have time to work through the issues. Having gone through the process of configuring ws-security myself, I understand the complexity.  There is no magic 'easy' button to push.  If you are not familiar with all the moving parts like policies, certificates, public and private keys, credential stores, and so on, it can be a daunting task.  PeopleBooks documentation is good but does not offer a step-by-step example to follow.  Fear not, for those that want more help, there is a place to go. PeopleSoft released a Mobile Inventory Management application over a year ago.  It is a mobile app built with Oracle Fusion Application Development Framework (ADF) that accesses PeopleSoft content through standard web services.  Part of the installation of this app is configuring ws-security for the web services used in the application.  Appendix A of the PeopleSoft FSCM91 Mobile Inventory Management Installation Guide is called Configuring WS-Security for Mobile Inventory Management.  It is a step-by-step guide to configure ws-security between a server running Oracle Web Server Management (OWSM) and PeopleSoft Integration Broker.  Your environment might be different, but the steps will be similar, and on the PeopleSoft side, Integration Broker will remain a constant. You can find the installation guide on Oracle Suport.  Sign in to https://support.us.oracle.com and search for document 1290972.1.  Read through Appendix A for more details about how to set up ws-security with PeopleSoft web services.

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  • How can I remove the Translation entries in apt?

    - by Lord of Time
    This is the output of aptitude update: Ign http://archive.canonical.com natty InRelease Ign http://extras.ubuntu.com natty InRelease Ign http://dl.google.com stable InRelease Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security InRelease Hit http://deb.torproject.org natty InRelease Get:1 http://dl.google.com stable Release.gpg [198 B] Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty InRelease Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates InRelease Hit http://archive.canonical.com natty Release.gpg Hit http://extras.ubuntu.com natty Release.gpg Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security Release.gpg Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty Release.gpg Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security Release Hit http://archive.canonical.com natty Release Hit http://extras.ubuntu.com natty Release Get:2 http://dl.google.com stable Release [1,338 B] Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates Release.gpg Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main Sources Hit http://archive.canonical.com natty/partner amd64 Packages Hit http://deb.torproject.org natty/main amd64 Packages Hit http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty Release Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted Sources Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe Sources Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse Sources Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main amd64 Packages Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted amd64 Packages Ign http://archive.canonical.com natty/partner TranslationIndex Hit http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe amd64 Packages Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse amd64 Packages Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main TranslationIndex Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse TranslationIndex Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted TranslationIndex Ign http://deb.torproject.org natty/main TranslationIndex Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe TranslationIndex Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates Release Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse amd64 Packages Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe TranslationIndex Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe Sources Get:3 http://dl.google.com stable/main amd64 Packages [469 B] Ign http://dl.google.com stable/main TranslationIndex Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse amd64 Packages Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe TranslationIndex Ign http://archive.canonical.com natty/partner Translation-en_US Ign http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main Translation-en Ign http://archive.canonical.com natty/partner Translation-en Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main Translation-en_US Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main Translation-en Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse Translation-en_US Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse Translation-en Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted Translation-en_US Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted Translation-en Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe Translation-en_US Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Ign http://dl.google.com stable/main Translation-en_US Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Ign http://dl.google.com stable/main Translation-en Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main Translation-en Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Ign http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Hit http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb Release.gpg Hit http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb Release Ign http://deb.torproject.org natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://deb.torproject.org natty/main Translation-en Hit http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb/apps amd64 Packages Ign http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb/apps TranslationIndex Ign http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb/apps Translation-en_US Ign http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb/apps Translation-en Fetched 2,005 B in 45s (44 B/s) Reading package lists... Is there any way I can get rid of the Translation stuff? I'm tired of it resulting in tons of repository checks rather than it checking far less repositories (69 actual repos vs. 169 checks)

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  • Should I be using a JavaScript SPA designed when security is important

    - by ryanzec
    I asked something kind of similar on stackoverflow with a particular piece of code however I want to try to ask this in a broader sense. So I have this web application that I have started to write in backbone using a Single Page Architecture (SPA) however I am starting to second guess myself because of security. Now we are not storing and sending credit card information or anything like that through this web application but we are storing sensitive information that people are uploading to us and will have the ability to re-download too. The obviously security concern that I have with JavaScript is that you can't trust anything that comes from JavaScript however in a Backbone SPA application, everything is being sent through JavaScript. There are two security features that I will have to build in JavaScript; permissions and authentication. The authentication piece is just me override the Backbone.Router.prototype.navigate method to check the fragment it is trying to load and if the JavaScript application.session.loggedIn is not set to true (and they are not viewing a none authenticated page), they are redirected to the login page automatically. The user could easily modify application.session.loggedIn to equal true (or modify Backbone.Router.prototype.navigate method) but then they would also have to not so easily dynamically embedded a link into the page (or modify a current one) that has the proper classes, data-* attributes, and href values to then load a page that should only be loaded when they user has logged in (and has the permissions). So I have an acl object that deals with the permissions stuff. All someone would have to do to view pages or parts of pages they should not be able to is to call acl.addPermission(resource, permission) with the proper permissions or modify the acl.hasPermission() to always return true and then navigate away and then back to the page. Now certain things is EMCAScript 5 like Object.seal() or Object.freeze() would help with some of this however we have to support IE 8 which does not support those pieces of functionality. Now the REST API also performs security checks on every request so technically even if they are able to see parts of the interface that they should not be able to, they still should not be able to actually affect any data. The main benefits for me in developing a JavaScript SPA application is that the application is a lot more responsive since it is only transferring the minimum amount of JSON data for the requested action and performing the minimum amount of work too. There are also other things that I think are beneficial like you are going to have to develop an API for the data (which is good if you want expand your application to different platforms/technologies) or their is more of a separation between front-end and back-end however if security is a concern, it is really wise to go down the road of a JavaScript SPA application for the front-end?

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  • Which Free Online Antivirus Scanner is the Best? [Comparison Test and Results]

    - by Asian Angel
    There are times when an online or supplementary scanner can be very useful when cleaning up an infected computer or just to get a second opinion on the security of your system. With this purpose in mind, the good folks over at the 7 Tutorials blog decided to do a test using the ten most popular online security scanners to see what worked the best and what did not. The following scanners were used for the test: Bitdefender QuickScan, BullGuard Online Scanner, Comodo Cloud Scanner, ESET Free Online Scanner, F-Secure Online Scanner, Kaspersky Security Scan, McAfee Security Scan Plus, Norton Security Scan, Panda ActiveScan and Trend Micro HouseCall. Are there any online or supplementary scanners that you use and depend on? Do you agree or disagree with the results? Let us know in the comments! Test Comparison – What is the Best Free Online Antivirus Scanner? [7 Tutorials] HTG Explains: Why Linux Doesn’t Need Defragmenting How to Convert News Feeds to Ebooks with Calibre How To Customize Your Wallpaper with Google Image Searches, RSS Feeds, and More

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  • TDE Tablespace Encryption 11.2.0.1 Certified with EBS 11i

    - by Steven Chan
    Oracle Advanced Security is an optional licenced Oracle 11g Database add-on.  Oracle Advanced Security Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) offers two different features:  column encryption and tablespace encryption.  TDE Tablespace Encryption 11.2.0.1 is now certified with Oracle E-Business Suite Release 11i. What is Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) ? Oracle Advanced Security Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) allows you to protect data at rest. TDE helps address privacy and PCI requirements by encrypting personally identifiable information (PII) such as Social Security numbers and credit card numbers. TDE is completely transparent to existing applications with no triggers, views or other application changes required. Data is transparently encrypted when written to disk and transparently decrypted after an application user has successfully authenticated and passed all authorization checks. Authorization checks include verifying the user has the necessary select and update privileges on the application table and checking Database Vault, Label Security and Virtual Private Database enforcement policies.

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  • New security configuration flag in UCM PS3

    - by kyle.hatlestad
    While the recent Patch Set 3 (PS3) release was mostly focused on bug fixes and such, a new configuration flag was added for security. In 10gR3 and prior versions, UCM had a component called Collaboration Manager which allowed for project folders to be created and groups of users assigned as members to collaborate on documents. With this component came access control lists (ACL) for content and folders. Users could assign specific security rights on each and every document and folder within a project. And it was possible to enable these ACL's without having the Collaboration Manager component enabled. But it took some special instructions (see technote# 603148.1) and added some extraneous pieces still related to Collaboration Manager. When 11g came out, Collaboration Manager was no longer available. But the configuration settings to turn on ACLs were still there. Well, in PS3 they've been cleaned up a bit and a new configuration flag has been added to simply turn on the ACL fields and none of the other collaboration bits. To enable ACLs: UseEntitySecurity=true Along with this configuration flag to turn ACLs on, you also need to define which Security Groups will honor the ACL fields. If an ACL is applied to a content item with a Security Group outside this list, it will be ignored. SpecialAuthGroups=HumanResources,Legal,Marketing Save the settings and restart the instance. Upon restart, two new metadata fields will be created: xClbraUserList, xClbraAliasList. If you are using OracleTextSearch as the search indexer, be sure to run a Fast Rebuild on the collection. On the Check In, Search, and Update pages, values are added by simply typing in the value and getting a type-ahead list of possible values. Select the value, click Add and then set the level of access (Read, Write, Delete, or Admin). If all of the fields are blank, then it simply falls back to just Security Group and Account access. As for how they are stored in the metadata fields, each entry starts with it's identifier: ampersand (&) symbol for users, "at" (@) symbol for groups, and colon (:) for roles. Following that is the entity name. And at the end is the level of access in paranthesis. e.g. (RWDA). And each entry is separated by a comma. So if you were populating values through batch loader or an external source, the values would be defined this way. Detailed information on Access Control Lists can be found in the Oracle Fusion Middleware System Administrator's Guide for Oracle Content Server.

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  • Where to draw the line between development-led security and administration-led security?

    - by haylem
    There are cases where you have the opportunity, as a developer, to enforce stricter security features and protections on a software, though they could very well be managed at an environmental level (ie, the operating system would take care of it). Where would you say you draw the line, and what elements do you factor in your decision? Concrete Examples User Management is the OS's responsibility Not exactly meant as a security feature, but in a similar case Google Chrome used to not allow separate profiles. The invoked reason (though it now supports multiple profiles for a same OS user) used to be that user management was the operating system's responsibility. Disabling Web-Form Fields A recurrent request I see addressed online is to have auto-completion be disabled on form fields. Auto-completion didn't exist in old browsers, and was a welcome feature at the time it was introduced for people who needed to fill in forms often. But it also brought in some security concerns, and so some browsers started to implement, on top of the (obviously needed) setting in their own preference/customization panel, an autocomplete attribute for form or input fields. And this has now been introduced into the upcoming HTML5 standard. For browsers who do not listen to this attribute, strange hacks *\ are offered, like generating unique IDs and names for fields to avoid them from being suggested in future forms (which comes with another herd of issues, like polluting your local auto-fill cache and not preventing a password from being stored in it, but instead probably duplicating its occurences). In this particular case, and others, I'd argue that this is a user setting and that it's the user's desire and the user's responsibility to enable or disable auto-fill (by disabling the feature altogether). And if it is based on an internal policy and security requirement in a corporate environment, then substitute the user for the administrator in the above. I assume it could be counter-argued that the user may want to access non-critical applications (or sites) with this handy feature enabled, and critical applications with this feature disabled. But then I'd think that's what security zones are for (in some browsers), or the sign that you need a more secure (and dedicated) environment / account to use these applications. * I obviously don't deny the ingenuity of the people who were forced to find workarounds, just the necessity of said workarounds. Questions That was a tad long-winded, so I guess my questions are: Would you in general consider it to be the application's (hence, the developer's) responsiblity? Where do you draw the line, if not in the "general" case?

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  • Development-led security vs administration-led security in a software product?

    - by haylem
    There are cases where you have the opportunity, as a developer, to enforce stricter security features and protections on a software, though they could very well be managed at an environmental level (ie, the operating system would take care of it). Where would you say you draw the line, and what elements do you factor in your decision? Concrete Examples User Management is the OS's responsibility Not exactly meant as a security feature, but in a similar case Google Chrome used to not allow separate profiles. The invoked reason (though it now supports multiple profiles for a same OS user) used to be that user management was the operating system's responsibility. Disabling Web-Form Fields A recurrent request I see addressed online is to have auto-completion be disabled on form fields. Auto-completion didn't exist in old browsers, and was a welcome feature at the time it was introduced for people who needed to fill in forms often. But it also brought in some security concerns, and so some browsers started to implement, on top of the (obviously needed) setting in their own preference/customization panel, an autocomplete attribute for form or input fields. And this has now been introduced into the upcoming HTML5 standard. For browsers that do not listen to this attribute, strange hacks* are offered, like generating unique IDs and names for fields to avoid them from being suggested in future forms (which comes with another herd of issues, like polluting your local auto-fill cache and not preventing a password from being stored in it, but instead probably duplicating its occurences). In this particular case, and others, I'd argue that this is a user setting and that it's the user's desire and the user's responsibility to enable or disable auto-fill (by disabling the feature altogether). And if it is based on an internal policy and security requirement in a corporate environment, then substitute the user for the administrator in the above. I assume it could be counter-argued that the user may want to access non-critical applications (or sites) with this handy feature enabled, and critical applications with this feature disabled. But then I'd think that's what security zones are for (in some browsers), or the sign that you need a more secure (and dedicated) environment / account to use these applications. * I obviously don't deny the ingeniosity of the people who were forced to find workarounds, just the necessity of said workarounds. Questions That was a tad long-winded, so I guess my questions are: Would you in general consider it to be the application's (hence, the developer's) responsiblity? Where do you draw the line, if not in the "general" case?

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  • How to add custom SOAP-Header element to the generated WSDL in Spring-WS

    - by Petr Macek
    Hi, we are migrating from WebLogic web-services to Spring-WS (1.5.X). There is currently one issue we are facing: We need to pass a context object (on WLS it is passed as SOAP-Header element) to other services that are still running on WLS from the Spring-WS powered service. The header element is still formulated on client side and the newly created WS (Spring-WS) should just pass it to other services. I can imagine how the custom element would be passed: override the doWithMessage(WebServiceMessage message) method... Is there a way to generate the wsdl with the help of DefaultWsdl11Definition to contain that custom header element? See the example: <wsdl:operation name="GetSomeInformation"> <soap:operation soapAction="http://www.dummyservice.com/InformationService/GetSomeInformation" /> <wsdl:input> <soap:body use="literal" /> <soap:header message="ctx:ServiceContextMessage" part="serviceContext" use="literal" /> </wsdl:input> <wsdl:output> <soap:body use="literal" /> </wsdl:output> <wsdl:fault name="Error"> <soap:fault name="Error" use="literal" /> </wsdl:fault> </wsdl:operation> Thanks for help

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  • Is it safe to reuse javax.xml.ws.Service objects

    - by Noel Ang
    I have JAX-WS style web service client that was auto-generated with the NetBeans IDE. The generated proxy factory (extends javax.xml.ws.Service) delegates proxy creation to the various Service.getPort methods. The application that I am maintaining instantiates the factory and obtains a proxy each time it calls the targetted service. Creating the new proxy factory instances repeatedly has been shown to be expensive, given that the WSDL documentation supplied to the factory constructor, an HTTP URI, is re-retrieved for each instantiation. We had success in improving the performance by caching the WSDL. But this has ugly maintenance and packaging implications for us. I would like to explore the suitability of caching the proxy factory itself. Is it safe, e.g., can two different client classes, executing on the same JVM and targetting the same web service, safely use the same factory to obtain distinct proxy objects (or a shared, reentrant one)? I've been unable to find guidance from either the JAX-WS specification nor the javax.xml.ws API documentation. The factory-proxy multiplicity is unclear to me. Having Service.getPort rather than Service.createPort does not inspire confidence.

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