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  • Detecting a TPM chip?

    - by Danielb
    I have a HP Mini 311-1000CA netbook running Windows 7 Ultimate. I'd really like to encrypt the harddrive using BitLocker but I am unsure as to how to work out if the Mini has a TPM chip or not. Any ideas?

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  • TPM had to be reintialized: Does a new recovery password have to be uploaded to AD?

    - by MDMoore313
    Some way some how, a user's machine couldn't get read the bitlocker password off of the TPM chip, and I had to enter the recovery key (stored in AD) to get in. No big deal, but once in the machine, I tried to suspend bitlocker per recovery documentation, and got an error message about the TPM not being initialized. I knew the TPM was on and activated in the BIOS, but Windows still made me reinitialize the TPM chip, and in the process it created a new TPM owner password. I found that odd because it prompted me to save this password or print it (there wasn't an option not to), but it made no reference of a recovery password, nor did it back this password up to AD. After the user took her laptop and left I started thinking that if the TPM password change, does the recovery password change also? If so, that new recovery password will need to be uploaded to AD, but MS' documentation doesn't make that clear, and doesn't back up the new recovery key (if one exists) to AD automatically when the group policy says it must, and from a network standpoint AD is accessible.

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  • New Supply Chain, S&OP, & TPM Analyst Reports from Gartner, IDC Now Available

    - by Mike Liebson
    Check out these analyst reports Oracle has recently made available for customers and partners on Oracle.com: Gartner:  MarketScope for Stage 3 Sales and Operations Planning  -  Gartner lead supply chain planning analyst, Tim Payne, discusses the evolving definition of S&OP, the Gartner S&OP maturity model, and recommendations for selecting S&OP technology solutions. Gartner: Vendor Panorama for Trade Promotion Management in Consumer Goods  -  Consumer goods analyst, Dale Hagemeyer, presents an overview of the TPM market, followed by an analysis of vendor offerings. IDC:  Perspective: Oracle OpenWorld 2012 — Supply Chain as a Focus  -  Supply chain analyst, Simon Ellis, discusses supply chain highlights from the October OpenWorld conference. Value Chain Planning highlights include the VCP product roadmap and demand sensing presentations by Electronic Arts (Demantra) and Sony (Demand Signal Repository). For a complete set of analyst reports, visit here.

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  • Change Bitlocker to use the TPM plus a USB key and a PIN

    - by Christopher Edwards
    I have bitlocker running on Windows 7 (x86) on a Dell D630 laptop (it has a 1.2 TPM). It is running in transparent mode. I'd like to know how to configure it to use a PIN and a USB key as well, but I can't find anything that looks like it does this in the UI. Does anyone know how to do this? Do I have to remove bitlocker and re-enable it?? (This should be possible according to this - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitLocker_Drive_Encryption)

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  • The BitLocker encrypted logical drive of my laptop is not accessible. On clicking error appears,"Application not found"

    - by Nauman Khan
    I had an important personal data that was stored in my laptop drive 'F'. My 4 year old son also uses my laptop to play games. To secure my data I used bitlocker software that was already there in my windows 7 ultimate 32 bit. I am using a Dell D 630 Core2Duo laptop. The thing worked fine for me and I have been able to access my data in drive 'F' as and when I required. But today, when I tried to open my 'F' drive, an error box appeared saying "Application not found". I right clicked and checked 'properties' of 'F' drive. It showed me Used Space = 0 bytes and Free Space = 0 bytes. I opened 'Disk Management' which showed my 'F' drive file system as 'Unknown (Bitlocker Encrypted). 'Disk Management' is also showing my 'F' drive as healthy logical drive. I opened 'Manage bitlocker' and found that my 'F' drive was being shown locked and 'Unlock Drive' was displayed against it, however, when i click on 'Unlock Drive', it does not function. I opened 'TPM Administration' and found an information that 'Compatible TPM cannot be found'. My bitlocker encryption was working fine which means that I had a compatible TPM in my laptop. Where has it gone? How can I enable it? Is my 'F' Drive lost forever and thus the data in there as well?

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  • Help me with the simplest program for "Trusted" application

    - by idazuwaika
    Hi, I hope anyone from the large community here can help me write the simplest "Trusted" program that I can expand from. I'm using Ubuntu Linux 9.04, with TPM emulator 0.60 from Mario Strasser (http://tpm-emulator.berlios.de/). I have installed the emulator and Trousers, and can successfully run programs from tpm-tools after running tpmd and tcsd daemons. I hope to start developing my application, but I have problems compiling the code below. #include <trousers/tss.h> #include <trousers/trousers.h> #include <stdio.h> TSS_HCONTEXT hContext; int main() { Tspi_Context_Create(&hContext); Tspi_Context_Close(hContext); return 0; } After trying to compile with g++ tpm.cpp -o tpmexe I receive errors undefined reference to 'Tspi_Context_Create' undefined reference to 'Tspi_Context_Close' What do I have to #include to successfully compile this? Is there anything that I miss? I'm familiar with C, but not exactly so with Linux/Unix programming environment. ps: I am a part time student in Master in Information Security programme. My involvement with programming has been largely for academic purposes.

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  • HP ProLiant DL980-Oracle TPC-C Benchmark spat

    - by jchang
    The Register reported a spat between HP and Oracle on the TPC-C benchmark. Per above, HP submitted a TPC-C result of 3,388,535 tpm-C for their ProLiant DL980 G7 (8 Xeon X7560 processors), with a cost of $0.63 per tpm-C. Oracle has refused permission to publish. Late last year (2010) Oracle published a result of 30M tpm-C for a 108 processors (sockets) SPARC cluster ($30M complete system cost). Oracle is now comparing this to the HP Superdome result from 2007 of 4M tpm-C at $2.93 per tpm-C, calling...(read more)

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  • Dell Vostro 1510 slow boot

    - by pkswatch
    I have an old Dell Vostro 1510 with Ubuntu and Windows 7 on it. When it is switched on, it shows the following message: NO TPM OR TPM HAS ERROR SYSTEM BIOS SHADOWED VIDEO BIOS SHADOWED Then it waits on the same screen for about 70-80 seconds before showing up the grub. I read about tpm problems but did not get anything about shadowed problems. So my guess is tpm isn't the reason for this slow booting (am I right?) But then what is it exactly? Please help..

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  • Demantra USA Based Companies and SOX Compliance

    - by user702295
    A USA based company is assessing Demantra Trade Promotion Management (TPM) capability.  It appears that SOX is necessary in their case due to the nature of what TPM does and the necessity for auditability.  Do we have any detail on SOX compliance for Demantra? Answser ------- SOX compliance with regards to IT: 1.  Requires auditing of data changes done by who, what, when     a. Audit trail profiles can be set up for key financial series and view them in audit trail reports     b. One functionality we do not have which typically is asked for is user login history. We have only        active sessions, history is not available. 2.  Segregation of duties     a. With respect to TPM, you could have deduction and financial analyst for settlement be different        from promotion creator, promotion approver or sales team.     b. Budget Approver for funds can be different from funds consumer.     c. Promotion creator can be different than promotion approver     d. For a US customer you may have to write some custom scripts to capture promotion status change        and produce an external report as part of compliance. One additional requirement is transparency of forward commitments entered into with retailers / distributors for trade spending, promotions.  Outside of Demantra - Consumer Goods Trade Funds Analytics.

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  • Toorcon14

    - by danx
    Toorcon 2012 Information Security Conference San Diego, CA, http://www.toorcon.org/ Dan Anderson, October 2012 It's almost Halloween, and we all know what that means—yes, of course, it's time for another Toorcon Conference! Toorcon is an annual conference for people interested in computer security. This includes the whole range of hackers, computer hobbyists, professionals, security consultants, press, law enforcement, prosecutors, FBI, etc. We're at Toorcon 14—see earlier blogs for some of the previous Toorcon's I've attended (back to 2003). This year's "con" was held at the Westin on Broadway in downtown San Diego, California. The following are not necessarily my views—I'm just the messenger—although I could have misquoted or misparaphrased the speakers. Also, I only reviewed some of the talks, below, which I attended and interested me. MalAndroid—the Crux of Android Infections, Aditya K. Sood Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata, Rebecca "bx" Shapiro Privacy at the Handset: New FCC Rules?, Valkyrie Hacking Measured Boot and UEFI, Dan Griffin You Can't Buy Security: Building the Open Source InfoSec Program, Boris Sverdlik What Journalists Want: The Investigative Reporters' Perspective on Hacking, Dave Maas & Jason Leopold Accessibility and Security, Anna Shubina Stop Patching, for Stronger PCI Compliance, Adam Brand McAfee Secure & Trustmarks — a Hacker's Best Friend, Jay James & Shane MacDougall MalAndroid—the Crux of Android Infections Aditya K. Sood, IOActive, Michigan State PhD candidate Aditya talked about Android smartphone malware. There's a lot of old Android software out there—over 50% Gingerbread (2.3.x)—and most have unpatched vulnerabilities. Of 9 Android vulnerabilities, 8 have known exploits (such as the old Gingerbread Global Object Table exploit). Android protection includes sandboxing, security scanner, app permissions, and screened Android app market. The Android permission checker has fine-grain resource control, policy enforcement. Android static analysis also includes a static analysis app checker (bouncer), and a vulnerablity checker. What security problems does Android have? User-centric security, which depends on the user to grant permission and make smart decisions. But users don't care or think about malware (the're not aware, not paranoid). All they want is functionality, extensibility, mobility Android had no "proper" encryption before Android 3.0 No built-in protection against social engineering and web tricks Alternative Android app markets are unsafe. Simply visiting some markets can infect Android Aditya classified Android Malware types as: Type A—Apps. These interact with the Android app framework. For example, a fake Netflix app. Or Android Gold Dream (game), which uploads user files stealthy manner to a remote location. Type K—Kernel. Exploits underlying Linux libraries or kernel Type H—Hybrid. These use multiple layers (app framework, libraries, kernel). These are most commonly used by Android botnets, which are popular with Chinese botnet authors What are the threats from Android malware? These incude leak info (contacts), banking fraud, corporate network attacks, malware advertising, malware "Hackivism" (the promotion of social causes. For example, promiting specific leaders of the Tunisian or Iranian revolutions. Android malware is frequently "masquerated". That is, repackaged inside a legit app with malware. To avoid detection, the hidden malware is not unwrapped until runtime. The malware payload can be hidden in, for example, PNG files. Less common are Android bootkits—there's not many around. What they do is hijack the Android init framework—alteering system programs and daemons, then deletes itself. For example, the DKF Bootkit (China). Android App Problems: no code signing! all self-signed native code execution permission sandbox — all or none alternate market places no robust Android malware detection at network level delayed patch process Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata Rebecca "bx" Shapiro, Dartmouth College, NH https://github.com/bx/elf-bf-tools @bxsays on twitter Definitions. "ELF" is an executable file format used in linking and loading executables (on UNIX/Linux-class machines). "Weird machine" uses undocumented computation sources (I think of them as unintended virtual machines). Some examples of "weird machines" are those that: return to weird location, does SQL injection, corrupts the heap. Bx then talked about using ELF metadata as (an uintended) "weird machine". Some ELF background: A compiler takes source code and generates a ELF object file (hello.o). A static linker makes an ELF executable from the object file. A runtime linker and loader takes ELF executable and loads and relocates it in memory. The ELF file has symbols to relocate functions and variables. ELF has two relocation tables—one at link time and another one at loading time: .rela.dyn (link time) and .dynsym (dynamic table). GOT: Global Offset Table of addresses for dynamically-linked functions. PLT: Procedure Linkage Tables—works with GOT. The memory layout of a process (not the ELF file) is, in order: program (+ heap), dynamic libraries, libc, ld.so, stack (which includes the dynamic table loaded into memory) For ELF, the "weird machine" is found and exploited in the loader. ELF can be crafted for executing viruses, by tricking runtime into executing interpreted "code" in the ELF symbol table. One can inject parasitic "code" without modifying the actual ELF code portions. Think of the ELF symbol table as an "assembly language" interpreter. It has these elements: instructions: Add, move, jump if not 0 (jnz) Think of symbol table entries as "registers" symbol table value is "contents" immediate values are constants direct values are addresses (e.g., 0xdeadbeef) move instruction: is a relocation table entry add instruction: relocation table "addend" entry jnz instruction: takes multiple relocation table entries The ELF weird machine exploits the loader by relocating relocation table entries. The loader will go on forever until told to stop. It stores state on stack at "end" and uses IFUNC table entries (containing function pointer address). The ELF weird machine, called "Brainfu*k" (BF) has: 8 instructions: pointer inc, dec, inc indirect, dec indirect, jump forward, jump backward, print. Three registers - 3 registers Bx showed example BF source code that implemented a Turing machine printing "hello, world". More interesting was the next demo, where bx modified ping. Ping runs suid as root, but quickly drops privilege. BF modified the loader to disable the library function call dropping privilege, so it remained as root. Then BF modified the ping -t argument to execute the -t filename as root. It's best to show what this modified ping does with an example: $ whoami bx $ ping localhost -t backdoor.sh # executes backdoor $ whoami root $ The modified code increased from 285948 bytes to 290209 bytes. A BF tool compiles "executable" by modifying the symbol table in an existing ELF executable. The tool modifies .dynsym and .rela.dyn table, but not code or data. Privacy at the Handset: New FCC Rules? "Valkyrie" (Christie Dudley, Santa Clara Law JD candidate) Valkyrie talked about mobile handset privacy. Some background: Senator Franken (also a comedian) became alarmed about CarrierIQ, where the carriers track their customers. Franken asked the FCC to find out what obligations carriers think they have to protect privacy. The carriers' response was that they are doing just fine with self-regulation—no worries! Carriers need to collect data, such as missed calls, to maintain network quality. But carriers also sell data for marketing. Verizon sells customer data and enables this with a narrow privacy policy (only 1 month to opt out, with difficulties). The data sold is not individually identifiable and is aggregated. But Verizon recommends, as an aggregation workaround to "recollate" data to other databases to identify customers indirectly. The FCC has regulated telephone privacy since 1934 and mobile network privacy since 2007. Also, the carriers say mobile phone privacy is a FTC responsibility (not FCC). FTC is trying to improve mobile app privacy, but FTC has no authority over carrier / customer relationships. As a side note, Apple iPhones are unique as carriers have extra control over iPhones they don't have with other smartphones. As a result iPhones may be more regulated. Who are the consumer advocates? Everyone knows EFF, but EPIC (Electrnic Privacy Info Center), although more obsecure, is more relevant. What to do? Carriers must be accountable. Opt-in and opt-out at any time. Carriers need incentive to grant users control for those who want it, by holding them liable and responsible for breeches on their clock. Location information should be added current CPNI privacy protection, and require "Pen/trap" judicial order to obtain (and would still be a lower standard than 4th Amendment). Politics are on a pro-privacy swing now, with many senators and the Whitehouse. There will probably be new regulation soon, and enforcement will be a problem, but consumers will still have some benefit. Hacking Measured Boot and UEFI Dan Griffin, JWSecure, Inc., Seattle, @JWSdan Dan talked about hacking measured UEFI boot. First some terms: UEFI is a boot technology that is replacing BIOS (has whitelisting and blacklisting). UEFI protects devices against rootkits. TPM - hardware security device to store hashs and hardware-protected keys "secure boot" can control at firmware level what boot images can boot "measured boot" OS feature that tracks hashes (from BIOS, boot loader, krnel, early drivers). "remote attestation" allows remote validation and control based on policy on a remote attestation server. Microsoft pushing TPM (Windows 8 required), but Google is not. Intel TianoCore is the only open source for UEFI. Dan has Measured Boot Tool at http://mbt.codeplex.com/ with a demo where you can also view TPM data. TPM support already on enterprise-class machines. UEFI Weaknesses. UEFI toolkits are evolving rapidly, but UEFI has weaknesses: assume user is an ally trust TPM implicitly, and attached to computer hibernate file is unprotected (disk encryption protects against this) protection migrating from hardware to firmware delays in patching and whitelist updates will UEFI really be adopted by the mainstream (smartphone hardware support, bank support, apathetic consumer support) You Can't Buy Security: Building the Open Source InfoSec Program Boris Sverdlik, ISDPodcast.com co-host Boris talked about problems typical with current security audits. "IT Security" is an oxymoron—IT exists to enable buiness, uptime, utilization, reporting, but don't care about security—IT has conflict of interest. There's no Magic Bullet ("blinky box"), no one-size-fits-all solution (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)). Regulations don't make you secure. The cloud is not secure (because of shared data and admin access). Defense and pen testing is not sexy. Auditors are not solution (security not a checklist)—what's needed is experience and adaptability—need soft skills. Step 1: First thing is to Google and learn the company end-to-end before you start. Get to know the management team (not IT team), meet as many people as you can. Don't use arbitrary values such as CISSP scores. Quantitive risk assessment is a myth (e.g. AV*EF-SLE). Learn different Business Units, legal/regulatory obligations, learn the business and where the money is made, verify company is protected from script kiddies (easy), learn sensitive information (IP, internal use only), and start with low-hanging fruit (customer service reps and social engineering). Step 2: Policies. Keep policies short and relevant. Generic SANS "security" boilerplate policies don't make sense and are not followed. Focus on acceptable use, data usage, communications, physical security. Step 3: Implementation: keep it simple stupid. Open source, although useful, is not free (implementation cost). Access controls with authentication & authorization for local and remote access. MS Windows has it, otherwise use OpenLDAP, OpenIAM, etc. Application security Everyone tries to reinvent the wheel—use existing static analysis tools. Review high-risk apps and major revisions. Don't run different risk level apps on same system. Assume host/client compromised and use app-level security control. Network security VLAN != segregated because there's too many workarounds. Use explicit firwall rules, active and passive network monitoring (snort is free), disallow end user access to production environment, have a proxy instead of direct Internet access. Also, SSL certificates are not good two-factor auth and SSL does not mean "safe." Operational Controls Have change, patch, asset, & vulnerability management (OSSI is free). For change management, always review code before pushing to production For logging, have centralized security logging for business-critical systems, separate security logging from administrative/IT logging, and lock down log (as it has everything). Monitor with OSSIM (open source). Use intrusion detection, but not just to fulfill a checkbox: build rules from a whitelist perspective (snort). OSSEC has 95% of what you need. Vulnerability management is a QA function when done right: OpenVas and Seccubus are free. Security awareness The reality is users will always click everything. Build real awareness, not compliance driven checkbox, and have it integrated into the culture. Pen test by crowd sourcing—test with logging COSSP http://www.cossp.org/ - Comprehensive Open Source Security Project What Journalists Want: The Investigative Reporters' Perspective on Hacking Dave Maas, San Diego CityBeat Jason Leopold, Truthout.org The difference between hackers and investigative journalists: For hackers, the motivation varies, but method is same, technological specialties. For investigative journalists, it's about one thing—The Story, and they need broad info-gathering skills. J-School in 60 Seconds: Generic formula: Person or issue of pubic interest, new info, or angle. Generic criteria: proximity, prominence, timeliness, human interest, oddity, or consequence. Media awareness of hackers and trends: journalists becoming extremely aware of hackers with congressional debates (privacy, data breaches), demand for data-mining Journalists, use of coding and web development for Journalists, and Journalists busted for hacking (Murdock). Info gathering by investigative journalists include Public records laws. Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is good, but slow. California Public Records Act is a lot stronger. FOIA takes forever because of foot-dragging—it helps to be specific. Often need to sue (especially FBI). CPRA is faster, and requests can be vague. Dumps and leaks (a la Wikileaks) Journalists want: leads, protecting ourselves, our sources, and adapting tools for news gathering (Google hacking). Anonomity is important to whistleblowers. They want no digital footprint left behind (e.g., email, web log). They don't trust encryption, want to feel safe and secure. Whistleblower laws are very weak—there's no upside for whistleblowers—they have to be very passionate to do it. Accessibility and Security or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Halting Problem Anna Shubina, Dartmouth College Anna talked about how accessibility and security are related. Accessibility of digital content (not real world accessibility). mostly refers to blind users and screenreaders, for our purpose. Accessibility is about parsing documents, as are many security issues. "Rich" executable content causes accessibility to fail, and often causes security to fail. For example MS Word has executable format—it's not a document exchange format—more dangerous than PDF or HTML. Accessibility is often the first and maybe only sanity check with parsing. They have no choice because someone may want to read what you write. Google, for example, is very particular about web browser you use and are bad at supporting other browsers. Uses JavaScript instead of links, often requiring mouseover to display content. PDF is a security nightmare. Executible format, embedded flash, JavaScript, etc. 15 million lines of code. Google Chrome doesn't handle PDF correctly, causing several security bugs. PDF has an accessibility checker and PDF tagging, to help with accessibility. But no PDF checker checks for incorrect tags, untagged content, or validates lists or tables. None check executable content at all. The "Halting Problem" is: can one decide whether a program will ever stop? The answer, in general, is no (Rice's theorem). The same holds true for accessibility checkers. Language-theoretic Security says complicated data formats are hard to parse and cannot be solved due to the Halting Problem. W3C Web Accessibility Guidelines: "Perceivable, Operable, Understandable, Robust" Not much help though, except for "Robust", but here's some gems: * all information should be parsable (paraphrasing) * if not parsable, cannot be converted to alternate formats * maximize compatibility in new document formats Executible webpages are bad for security and accessibility. They say it's for a better web experience. But is it necessary to stuff web pages with JavaScript for a better experience? A good example is The Drudge Report—it has hand-written HTML with no JavaScript, yet drives a lot of web traffic due to good content. A bad example is Google News—hidden scrollbars, guessing user input. Solutions: Accessibility and security problems come from same source Expose "better user experience" myth Keep your corner of Internet parsable Remember "Halting Problem"—recognize false solutions (checking and verifying tools) Stop Patching, for Stronger PCI Compliance Adam Brand, protiviti @adamrbrand, http://www.picfun.com/ Adam talked about PCI compliance for retail sales. Take an example: for PCI compliance, 50% of Brian's time (a IT guy), 960 hours/year was spent patching POSs in 850 restaurants. Often applying some patches make no sense (like fixing a browser vulnerability on a server). "Scanner worship" is overuse of vulnerability scanners—it gives a warm and fuzzy and it's simple (red or green results—fix reds). Scanners give a false sense of security. In reality, breeches from missing patches are uncommon—more common problems are: default passwords, cleartext authentication, misconfiguration (firewall ports open). Patching Myths: Myth 1: install within 30 days of patch release (but PCI §6.1 allows a "risk-based approach" instead). Myth 2: vendor decides what's critical (also PCI §6.1). But §6.2 requires user ranking of vulnerabilities instead. Myth 3: scan and rescan until it passes. But PCI §11.2.1b says this applies only to high-risk vulnerabilities. Adam says good recommendations come from NIST 800-40. Instead use sane patching and focus on what's really important. From NIST 800-40: Proactive: Use a proactive vulnerability management process: use change control, configuration management, monitor file integrity. Monitor: start with NVD and other vulnerability alerts, not scanner results. Evaluate: public-facing system? workstation? internal server? (risk rank) Decide:on action and timeline Test: pre-test patches (stability, functionality, rollback) for change control Install: notify, change control, tickets McAfee Secure & Trustmarks — a Hacker's Best Friend Jay James, Shane MacDougall, Tactical Intelligence Inc., Canada "McAfee Secure Trustmark" is a website seal marketed by McAfee. A website gets this badge if they pass their remote scanning. The problem is a removal of trustmarks act as flags that you're vulnerable. Easy to view status change by viewing McAfee list on website or on Google. "Secure TrustGuard" is similar to McAfee. Jay and Shane wrote Perl scripts to gather sites from McAfee and search engines. If their certification image changes to a 1x1 pixel image, then they are longer certified. Their scripts take deltas of scans to see what changed daily. The bottom line is change in TrustGuard status is a flag for hackers to attack your site. Entire idea of seals is silly—you're raising a flag saying if you're vulnerable.

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  • Problems enabling BitLocker on Windows 7 enterprise

    - by ericl42
    I had BitLocker turned on originally when I loaded the computer but had to turn it off to do some testing. I recently tried to turn it back on and I continue to get the following error: Blockquote A required TPM measurement is missing. If there is a bootable CD or DVD in your computer, remove it, restart the computer, and turn on BitLocker again. If the problem persists, ensure the master boot record is up to date. Blockquote I have verified that there is nothing in the DVD tray and that the laptop is not docked. I have also verified that TPM is running and I have no problems enabling BitLocker on a flash drive. I think it's a problem with my MBR since I am dual booting into Fedora as well but I am not sure how to fix it. (even though it did work a few months ago while I was also dual booted) Thank you for the help.

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  • Security of BitLocker with no PIN from WinPE?

    - by Scott Bussinger
    Say you have a computer with the system drive encrypted by BitLocker and you're not using a PIN so the computer will boot up unattended. What happens if an attacker boots the system up into the Windows Preinstallation Environment? Will they have access to the encrypted drive? Does it change if you have a TPM vs. using only a USB startup key? What I'm trying to determine is whether the TPM / USB startup key is usable without booting from the original operating system. In other words, if you're using a USB startup key and the machine is rebooted normally then the data would still be protected unless an attacker was able to log in. But what if the hacker just boots the server into a Windows Preinstallation Environment with the USB startup key plugged in? Would they then have access to the data? Or would that require the recovery key? Ideally the recovery key would be required when booted like this, but I haven't seen this documented anywhere.

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  • Election 2012: Twitter Breaks Records with MySQL

    - by Bertrand Matthelié
    Twitter VP of Infrastructure Operations Engineering Mazen Rawashdeh shared news and numbers yesterday on his blog: "Last night, the world tuned in to Twitter to share the election results as U.S. voters chose a president and settled many other campaigns. Throughout the day, people sent more than 31 million election-related Tweets (which contained certain key terms and relevant hashtags). And as results rolled in, we tracked the surge in election-related Tweets at 327,452 Tweets per minute (TPM). These numbers reflect the largest election-related Twitter conversation during our 6 years of existence, though they don’t capture the total volume of all Tweets yesterday." "Last night, Twitter averaged about 9,965 TPS from 8:11pm to 9:11pm PT, with a one-second peak of 15,107 TPS at 8:20pm PT and a one-minute peak of 874,560 TPM. Seeing a sustained peak over the course of an entire event is a change from the way people have previously turned to Twitter during live events. Now, rather than brief spikes, we are seeing sustained peaks for hours." Congrats to Jeremy Cole, Davi Arnaut and the rest of the team at Twitter for their excellent work! Jeremy recently held a keynote presentation at MySQL Connect describing how MySQL powers Twitter, and why they chose and continue to rely on MySQL for their operations. You can watch the presentation here. He also went into more details during another presentation later that day and you can access the slides here. Below a couple of tweets from Jeremy after what have surely been hectic days...  Keep up the good work guys!

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  • Enable bitlocker an save key to share

    - by user273694
    I have searched all over the web but cannot find a complete answer to this: How to enable Bitlocker on a laptop with TPM, and store a file with the Bitlocker recovery key and TPM password by USING THE manage-bde command line tool. The file should be the same as when created in the Bitlocker manager UI. I DO NOT want to save to AD. The same question was asked here but was not answered correctly. The goal is to write a script to be used with an endpoint manager. I have tried the following: manage-bde -on C: Works fine, but does not create or save a key. manage-bde -on C: -rk C:\myfolder\ and manage-bde -on C: -RecoveryKey C:\myfolder\ -rp The output from the last two methods state that a key has been saved to c:\myfolder and so on, but that is not the case. It also says that I have to: Save the password in a secure location Insert a USB flash drive with an external key file into the computer. Restart and run hardware test type "manage-bde -status" to check if the hardware test succeeded After a restart, I get an error saying that Bitlocker could not be enabled because the bitlocker startup key or recovery kpassword cannot be found on the USB device.... C: was not encrypted. Why am I asked to insert a USB?? I simply want to encrypt the hard drive and save the recovery information to a file automatically. Is that too much to ask? Help please!

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  • Is dual-booting an OS more or less secure than running a virtual machine?

    - by Mark
    I run two operating systems on two separate disk partitions on the same physical machine (a modern MacBook Pro). In order to isolate them from each other, I've taken the following steps: Configured /etc/fstab with ro,noauto (read-only, no auto-mount) Fully encrypted each partition with a separate encryption key (committed to memory) Let's assume that a virus infects my first partition unbeknownst to me. I log out of the first partition (which encrypts the volume), and then turn off the machine to clear the RAM. I then un-encrypt and boot into the second partition. Can I be reasonably confident that the virus has not / cannot infect both partitions, or am I playing with fire here? I realize that MBPs don't ship with a TPM, so a boot-loader infection going unnoticed is still a theoretical possibility. However, this risk seems about equal to the risk of the VMWare/VirtualBox Hypervisor being exploited when running a guest OS, especially since the MBP line uses UEFI instead of BIOS. This leads to my question: is the dual-partitioning approach outlined above more or less secure than using a Virtual Machine for isolation of services? Would that change if my computer had a TPM installed? Background: Note that I am of course taking all the usual additional precautions, such as checking for OS software updates daily, not logging in as an Admin user unless absolutely necessary, running real-time antivirus programs on both partitions, running a host-based firewall, monitoring outgoing network connections, etc. My question is really a public check to see if I'm overlooking anything here and try to figure out if my dual-boot scheme actually is more secure than the Virtual Machine route. Most importantly, I'm just looking to learn more about security issues. EDIT #1: As pointed out in the comments, the scenario is a bit on the paranoid side for my particular use-case. But think about people who may be in corporate or government settings and are considering using a Virtual Machine to run services or applications that are considered "high risk". Are they better off using a VM or a dual-boot scenario as I outlined? An answer that effectively weighs any pros/cons to that trade-off is what I'm really looking for in an answer to this post. EDIT #2: This question was partially fueled by debate about whether a Virtual Machine actually protects a host OS at all. Personally, I think it does, but consider this quote from Theo de Raadt on the OpenBSD mailing list: x86 virtualization is about basically placing another nearly full kernel, full of new bugs, on top of a nasty x86 architecture which barely has correct page protection. Then running your operating system on the other side of this brand new pile of shit. You are absolutely deluded, if not stupid, if you think that a worldwide collection of software engineers who can't write operating systems or applications without security holes, can then turn around and suddenly write virtualization layers without security holes. -http://kerneltrap.org/OpenBSD/Virtualization_Security By quoting Theo's argument, I'm not endorsing it. I'm simply pointing out that there are multiple perspectives here, so I'm trying to find out more about the issue.

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  • automating remote software installation

    - by akshay
    I have a network consisting of n pcs(windows/linux).Now i want to automate installation on n pcs in netowrk.For example with one click of gtalk should get installed on n pc in network.Are there any softwares(paid/open src) that can be used to do this?One such software is IBM TPM but its dam expensive and complicated i guess.Are such software popular, cam asking this since i am planning to develop such software which is low priced.

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  • Convert to Managed BitLocker

    - by Doug
    I've been setting up an encryption policy using MBAM; after some trial-and-error, I finally got it working! Adding new laptops is a breeze! However... I have several laptops that were encrypten using BitLocker (and they're reporting to the MBAM Console), but I can't manage the TPM password since they're not "owned" by the server. Anybody know of a way to get these few laptops integrated into my MBAM console?

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  • Bitlocker Repair Tool for windows 7 Ultimate

    - by user44212
    I have just enabled bitlocker using a flash drive without TPM on windows 7 Ultimate 64 bit. Just to be prepared - is there any way I can recover data from an encrypted volume in Windows 7 ultimate. I found links for BitLocker Repair Tool to help recover data from an encrypted volume for windows vista and windows 2008 here http://support.microsoft.com/kb/928201 but did not find anything on microsoft for windows 7. But did not find any for windows 7 Ultimate.

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  • Mounting /var /tmp /var/log to separate partition

    - by William MacDonald
    Per DISA hardening requirements for RHEL, I'm supposed to make sure a number of locations on the filesystem are mounted on separate partitions. A few of the locations they specify include /var /tpm /var/log etc. Is it possible to go about doing this on a live machine (without booting a separate OS)? And how would I go about doing that. I've backed up the OS so if I do screw something up I can recover. Thanks!

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  • BizTalk Server 2010 Beta available

    - by Rajesh Charagandla
    BizTalk Server 2010 Beta - Click Here to Download Overview: BizTalk Server 2010 offers significant enhancements to help integrate heterogeneous Line-of-business systems with Windows .NET and SharePoint based applications to optimize user productivity, gain business efficiency and increase agility . BizTalk Server 2010 allow .Net developers to take advantage of BizTalk services right out of the box to rapidly build solutions that need to integrate transactions and data from applications like SAP, Mainframes, MS Dynamics and Oracle. Similarly SharePoint developers can seamlessly use BizTalk services directly through the new Business Connectivity Services in SharePoint 2010. BizTalk Server 2010 includes new data mapping & transformation tool to dramatically reduce the development time to mediate data exchange between disparate systems. It also provide a new single dashboard to manage performance parameters and streamline deployments from development to test to production. BizTalk 2010 includes new, scalable Trading Partner Management (TPM) model with a graphical interface for flexible management of business partner relationships and efficient on-boarding process.

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  • replacing kernel on non-booting ec2 instance

    - by TheToolBox
    So I had an amazon ec2 instance crash during the update to 14.04LTS. Frustratingly, it appears the kernel might be bad (or at least that's what the log below says to me, I could totally be wrong). I'm able to mount the volume to another, working server, chroot the broken volume, and sudo apt-get remove linux-headers-3.MOSTRECENT. Unfortunately though, when I try sudo update-grub, it comes back with /usr/sbin/grub-probe: error: cannot find a device for / (is /dev mounted?). What am I missing? Here's the log from the server's attempted bootup: [H[J Booting 'Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, memtest86+' root (hd0) Filesystem type is ext2fs, using whole disk kernel /boot/memtest86+.bin ============= Init TPM Front ================ Tpmfront:Error Unable to read device/vtpm/0/backend-id during tpmfront initialization! error = ENOENT Tpmfront:Info Shutting down tpmfront xc: error: panic: xc_dom_core.c:621: xc_dom_find_loader: no loader found: Invalid kernel xc_dom_parse_image returned -1 close(3) Error 9: Unknown boot failure Press any key to continue... Thanks in advance!

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  • ec2 instance won't boot!

    - by TheToolBox
    So I had a server lose connection while updating to 14.04LTS. Foolishly, it ended up getting rebooted, and now I'm here. I disconnected the volume and mounted it on another system, chrooted it, and updated the kernel. Still no dice. Any idea what the problem could be? Thanks in advance! The instance log is below: ******************* BLKFRONT for device/vbd/2049 ********** backend at /local/domain/0/backend/vbd/3005/2049 Failed to read /local/domain/0/backend/vbd/3005/2049/feature-barrier. Failed to read /local/domain/0/backend/vbd/3005/2049/feature-flush-cache. 16777216 sectors of 512 bytes ************************** [H[J Booting 'Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, memtest86+' root (hd0) Filesystem type is ext2fs, using whole disk kernel /boot/memtest86+.bin ============= Init TPM Front ================ Tpmfront:Error Unable to read device/vtpm/0/backend-id during tpmfront initialization! error = ENOENT Tpmfront:Info Shutting down tpmfront xc: error: panic: xc_dom_core.c:621: xc_dom_find_loader: no loader found: Invalid kernel xc_dom_parse_image returned -1 close(3) Error 9: Unknown boot failure Press any key to continue...

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  • openSuse full disk encryption

    - by djechelon
    I'm a proud Suser. I'm about to reinstall 12.2 on my ASUS N76VZ (UEFI x64 laptop). Since I'm very sensitive about laptop security against theft or unwanted inspection, I chose to use BitLocker with USB dongle in Windows 7. When installing Suse the last time I found that only the home partition (separated from root) was capable of being encrypted. Does Suse offer a full disk encryption solution like BitLocker that I haven't discovered yet? Or is encrypting home partition the only way to protect data? Encrypting only home is feasible as one stores personal data in home, but I still would like to encrypt the whole thing! Also, using a hardware token (no TPM available) for unlocking is preferred to password, if possible! Thanks

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  • Windows API Error 2 when installing MikTex (Win7)

    - by GreenAsJade
    I am trying to install MikTex 2.9.3927 on Windows 7 x64. Very early in the installation process, I get a MikTex setup wizard error saying: "Windows API Error 2: The system cannot find the file specified Details: C:...\somefile.tpm" The file that results in the error seems to be different every time I try. I have tried many different installation paths, with many different setup options. The same error occurs if I download the ~138MB "Basic MiKTeX 2.9" Installer or if I use the Net Installer to download the entire setup (~1GB). Note that this is a duplicate question - the other copy of this question is closed to users of under 10 rep. I have asked it so that I can provide an updated answer...

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